U.S. Territorial Sea Extension: Jurisdiction and International Environmental Protection by Remy, Carol Elizabeth
Fordham International Law Journal
Volume 16, Issue 4 1992 Article 6
U.S. Territorial Sea Extension: Jurisdiction
and International Environmental Protection
Carol Elizabeth Remy∗
∗
Copyright c©1992 by the authors. Fordham International Law Journal is produced by The Berke-
ley Electronic Press (bepress). http://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/ilj
U.S. Territorial Sea Extension: Jurisdiction
and International Environmental Protection
Carol Elizabeth Remy
Abstract
This Note focuses on the United States’ reluctance to extend its sovereignty over its “territorial
sea.” Part I of this Note discusses the history and current status of UNCLOS III, the territorial sea,
the contiguous zone, the exclusive economic zone, and the 1988 Proclamation. Part II examines
the ongoing controversy in the U.S. Congress concerning federal versus state jurisdiciton over the
expanded territorial sea zone and refers to proposed legislation that demonstrates both positions
of the debate. Part III examines the effects of domestic enactment of the Proclamation on the
international community by analyzing several U.S. statues that would require amendment from
Congress if Congress extended the U.S. territorial sea to twelve miles.
U.S. TERRITORIAL SEA EXTENSION: JURISDICTION
AND INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION
INTRODUCTION
One of the major anomalies in recent international law has
been the United States' reluctance to extend its sovereignty
over its "territorial sea"' beyond three miles from its shore.2
The 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
("UNCLOS III" or the "Convention"), suggests that every na-
tion endorse a twelve-mile territorial sea limit.3  Fifty-six na-
tions have signed UNCLOS III as of August 1993, with sixty
signatories necessary to bring UNCLOS III into effect.4 To
1. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, arts. 2-4,
U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/122 (1982), reprinted in 21 I.L.M. 1261, 1272 (1982) [herein-
after UNCLOS III]. The territorial sea is the ocean area extending from the shore of
a coastal nation to a maximum of 12 nautical miles under international law. Id. art. 3,
21 I.L.M. at 1272. The coastal nation has complete sovereignty over this area includ-
ing the air space over the sea as well as its bed and subsoil. Id. art. 2, 21 I.L.M. at
1272.
2. Henry M. Arruda, Note, The Extension of the United States Territorial Sea: Reasons
and Effects, 4 CONN. J. INT'L L. 697, 705-06, (1989); see Limits of the Territorial Sea,
1988 DIGEST § 3 [hereinafter DIGEST] (reporting as of 1988, 104 nations claiming
territorial sea breadth of 12 miles, and only 12 nations, including United States, re-
taining breadth of three miles).
3. UNCLOS III, supra note 1, art. 3, 21 I.L.M. at 1272. The breadth of the terri-
torial sea was finally established at a maximum of 12 nautical miles in UNCLOS III
after unsuccessful attempts to specify a limit at the first and second conferences on
the law of the sea. Luc CUYVERS, OCEAN USES AND THEIIi REGULATION 154 (1984). A
12-mile limit is not required of UNCLOS III signatories, but by far the largest major-
ity of nations have a 12-mile limit. EDWARD DUNCAN BROWN & ROBIN ROLF CHURCH-
ILL, THE U.N. CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA: IMPACT AND IMPLEMENTATION
606 (1988). In December 1983, of 133 reporting coastal states, 82% had limits of 12
miles or less and 62% had limits of exactly 12 miles. UN OFFICE FOR OCEAN AFFAIRS
AND THE LAW OF THE SEA, LAW OF THE SEA BULLETIN No. 2, Dec. 1983. Eighteen
percent of reporting coastal states had limits greater than 12 miles, with 10% claim-
ing 200-mile limits. Id. Thus, a maximum of 12 miles was a compromise among the
various nations, without forcing any one nation to acquire sovereignty over more
maritime territory than it desired. CUYVERS, supra note 3, at 154.
4. Telephone interview with the United Nations, Office of Legal Affairs, Treaty
Division, New York, N.Y. (Aug. 9, 1993); Ambassador Satya N. Nandon, Former Un-
dersecretary General of the U.N. and Special Representative of the Secretary-General
(Ocean Affairs and Law of the Sea), Law of the Sea: Current Developments in
Boundary Law and the Law of the Sea Convention, Address Before the Association of
the Bar of the City of New York (Nov. 7, 1992) (notes on file with the Fordham Interna-
tional Law Journal) [hereinafter Nandon Speech].
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date, 114 nations have adopted a twelve-mile limit.5 There-
fore, a twelve-mile territorial sea limit arguably represents cus-
tomary international law as it is recognized by both UNCLOS
III and a majority of nations. 6 Although, the United States has
not yet ratified UNCLOS III," in 1988 President Ronald Rea-
gan proclaimed that the U.S. territorial sea would be extended
from three nautical miles8 to twelve nautical miles. 9
5. Id.
6. SHABTAI ROSENNE, PRACTICE AND METHODS OF INTERNATIONAL LAw 14, 55-58
(1984) [hereinafter ROSENNE]. Customary, as opposed to conventional international
law, is that part of international law not resting on a treaty basis. Id. It is considered
by the International Court of Justice as "international custom, [and] evidence of a
general practice accepted as law." Statute of the International Court ofJustice, June
26, 1945, art. 38, l(b), 59 Stat. 1055, 1060, 3 Bevans 1179, 1187. The principal
element of customary international law is the actual conduct of states in their interna-
tional relations. ROSENNE, supra, at 55. A principle or rule of customary international
law may be embodied in bipartite or multipartite agreements that have conventional
force for those nations that are parties to such agreement. Id. Customary interna-
tional law however may continue to be binding as a principle even to non-parties. Id.
7. Nandon Speech, supra note 4.
8. D.C. KAPOOR & ADAM J. KERR, A GUIDE TO MARITIME BOUNDARY DELIMITA-
TION 21 (1986). UNCLOS III uses the nautical mile as the unit of distance and length
measurement without defining this expression in linear terms. Id. The International
Hydrographic Conference of 1929 approved the value of 1852 meters for the "inter-
national nautical mile," which has been adopted by most maritime States and the
International Bureau of Weights and Measures. Id.
9. Proclamation No. 5928, 3 C.F.R. 547, 43 U.S.C. § 1331 (1988) [hereinafter
Proclamation or 1988 Proclamation]. The Proclamation provides that
[i]nternational law recognizes that coastal nations may exercise sovereignty
and jurisdiction over their territorial seas.
The territorial sea of the United States is a maritime zone extending beyond
the land territory and internal waters of the United States over which the
United States exercises sovereignty and jurisdiction, a sovereignty and juris-
diction that extend to the airspace over the territorial sea, as well as to its
bed and subsoil.
Extension of the territorial sea by the United States to the limits permitted
by international law will advance the national security and other significant
interests of the United States.
NOW, THEREFORE, I, RONALD REAGAN, by the authority vested in me
as President by the Constitution of the United States of America, and in
accordance with international law, do hereby proclaim the extension of the
territorial sea of the United States of America, the Commonwealth of Puerto
Rico, Guam, American Samoa, the United States Virgin Islands, the Com-
monwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, and any other territory or pos-
session over which the United States exercises sovereignty.
The territorial sea of the United States henceforth extends to 12 nautical
miles from the baselines of the United States determined in accordance with
international law.
In accordance with international law, as reflected in the applicable provi-
sions of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the .Sea, within
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Since 1988, the U.S. Congress has considered various pro-
posals to enact the Presidential Proclamation No. 5928 ("Proc-
lamation or 1988 Proclamation")to into domestic law." I Many
of the proposed bills would, in addition to extending the terri-
torial sea to twelve miles, extend the contiguous zone, 12 a zone
adjacent to the territorial sea, from twelve to twenty-four
miles.'" Domestic enactment of the 1988 Proclamation would
also affect approximately seventy-five federal statutes.'4 Many
of these statutes impact the international community by affect-
ing non-U.S. vessels.' 5 These U.S. regulations concern fishing,
importation, maritime safety, and environmental protection in
the twelve-mile zone.' 6 In addition to amending U.S. federal
the territorial sea of the United States, the ships of all countries enjoy the
right of innocent passage and the ships and aircraft of all countries enjoy the
right of transit passage through international straits.
Nothing in this Proclamation:
(a) extends or otherwise alters existing Federal or State law or anyjurisdic-
tion, rights, legal interests, or obligations derived therefrom; or
(b) impairs the determination, in accordance with international law, of any
maritime boundary of the United States with a foreign jurisdiction.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand this 27th day of
December, in the year of our Lord nineteen hundred and eighty-eight, and
of the independence of the United States of America the two hundred and
thirteenth.
Id.
10. ANNE R. ASHMORE, PRESIDENTIAL PROCLAMATIONS CONCERNING PUBLIC
LANDS 1-2 (1981). No law defines a Presidential Proclamation. Id. In 1957, the
House of Representatives Committee on Government Operations concluded that
"[e]xecutive orders and proclamations are directives or actions by the President.
When they are founded on the authority of the President derived from the Constitu-
tion or statute, they may have the force and effect of law." Id. (quoting STAFF OF
HOUSE COMM. ON GovT. OPERATIONS, 85TH CONG., IST SESS., EXECUTIVE ORDERS AND
PROCLAMATIONS: A STUDY OF A USE OF PRESIDENTIAL POWERS 1 (Comm. Print 1957)).
Proclamations generally concern matters of widespread interest that directly affect
private individuals, and thus can have the force of law if constitutional or statutory
authority is cited. Id. at 2.
11. See, e.g. H.R. 5069, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1988); H.R. 1405, 101st Cong.,
1st Sess. (1989); H.R. 3842, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991).
12. UNCLOS III, supra note 1, art. 33, 1(a), 21 I.L.M. at 1276. The contiguous
zone is a maritime zone adjacent to the territorial sea within which a nation can pre-
vent infringement of its customs, fiscal, immigration, and sanitary laws. Id. Within
this zone, a coastal state has the power to punish infringement of the above laws and
regulations committed within its territory or territorial sea. Id. art. 33, 1 (b).
13. See supra note 11 (citing several congressional bills proposing expansion of
both territorial sea and contiguous zone).
14. H.R. 3842, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991), at 5-18.
15. Id.
16. Id. Examples of federal statutes concerning fisheries, vessel safety and oper-
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statutes concerning the shipping industry, a congressional ex-
tension of the territorial sea would also decide whether the
federal or state governments should have jurisdiction over the
expanded three-to-twelve-mile zone. The issue',of federal ver-
sus state control over the newly acquired territorial sea is one
of the major controversies raised by the most recent legislative
proposals. 7
A solution to the conflict between federal versus state con-
trol over the expanded territorial sea may be found through
recognition of the United States' duty to uniformly protect its
coastal waters from marine pollution. The U.N. Convention
on the High Seas ("High Seas Convention"), ratified by the
United States in 1963, imposes a specific duty on every signa-
tory to promulgate regulations to prevent pollution of the seas
by exploitation of the seabed and subsoil.' 8 Moreover, UN-
CLOS III requires that every nation protect and preserve the
marine environment from any polluting source, and that na-
tions endeavor to harmonize their policies in this regard.' 9
ations, and environmental protection include the Marine Mammal Protection Act of
1972, 16 U.S.C. § 1362 (1988), Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. § 1532
(1988), Antarctic Marine Living Resources Convention Act, 16 U.S.C. § 2432 (1988),
Fur Seal Act of 1966, 16 U.S.C. § 1151 (1988), North Pacific Halibut Act, 16 U.S.C.
§ 773 (1988), Magnuson Fishery Conservation & Management Act of 1976, 16 U.S.C.
§ 1802 (1988 & Supp. III 1991), Shore Protection Act of 1988, 33 U.S.C. § 2601
(1988), Ocean Thermal Energy Conversion Act of 1980, 42 U.S.C. § 9102 (1988),
Rivers & Harbors Appropriation Act of 1915, 33 U.S.C. § 471 (1988), Vessel Bridge-
to-Bridge Radiotelephone Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1202 (1988 & Supp. 11 1990), Ports and
Waterways Safety Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1222 (1988), Deepwater Port Act of 1974, 33
U.S.C. § 1502 (1988), and the Oil Pollution Act of 1990, 33 U.S.C. § 2701(35) (Supp.
11 1990). See id. at 5-18.
17. Joel Glass, USA: Territorial Seas Bill Sparks Clash Over States' Submarine Rights
and Oil Spill Liabilities, Reuter Textline, Feb. 19, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Li-
brary, CURRNT File.
18. Convention on the High Seas, April 29, 1958, 13 U.S.T. 2312, 450 U.N.T.S.
82 [hereinafter High Seas Convention]. The High Seas Convention entered into
force for the United States on Sept. 30, 1962. Article 24 states
[elvery State shall draw up regulations to prevent pollution of the seas by
the discharge of oil from ships or pipelines or resulting from the exploita-
tion and exploration of the seabed and its subsoil, taking account of existing
treaty provisions on the subject.
High Seas Convention, supra, 13 U.S.T. at 2318, 450 U.N.T.S. at 98.
19. UNCLOS III, supra note 1, arts. 192, 194(1), 21 I.L.M. at 1308. Article
194(1) states that
[s]tates shall take, individually or jointly as appropriate, all measures consis-
tent with this Convention that are necessary to prevent, reduce and control
pollution of the marine environment from any source, using for this pur-
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The majority of provisions in UNCLOS III are considered by
many scholars to reflect customary international law.2" Under
this interpretation, the United States, although a non-adherent
to UNCLOS III, has the same duty to protect the marine envi-
ronment as do other nations that have ratified the Conven-
tion.2
Part I of this Note discusses the history and current status
of UNCLOS III, the territorial sea, the contiguous zone, the
exclusive economic zone, and the 1988 Proclamation. Part II
examines the ongoing controversy in the U.S. Congress con-
cerning federal versus state jurisdiction over the expanded ter-
ritorial sea zone and refers to proposed legislation that dem-
onstrates both positions of the debate. Part III examines the
effects of domestic enactment of the Proclamation on the inter-
national community by analyzing several U.S. statutes that
would require amendment if Congress extended the U.S. terri-
torial sea to twelve miles. Part III argues that the U.S. federal
government, not the individual states, should retain property
rights to the expanded territorial sea to allow the United States
to comply with its obligations to protect the marine environ-
ment imposed by customary international law, and suggested
under UNCLOS III. This Note concludes that a Congressional
expansion of the territorial sea would be advantageous for the
United States because it would permit enforcement of U.S.
laws within a wider area of the ocean space surrounding U.S.
coasts. This Note also concludes that complete federal juris-
diction over the newly acquired three-to-twelve-mile zone is
necessary to foster uniform marine protection, and harmoniza-
tion of U.S. policies with other UNCLOS III signatories'
marine protection standards.
pose the best practicable means at their disposal and in accordance with
their capabilities, and they shall endeavor to harmonize their policies in this
connection.
21 I.L.M. at 1308.
20. GERARD J. MAGONE, LAW FOR THE WORLD OCEAN 40 (1981); see supra note 6
and accompanying text (defining customary international law).
21. See supra note 6 and accompanying text (defining customary international
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I. HISTORY AND STATUS OF UNCLOS III, THE
TERRITORIAL SEA, OTHER MARITIME ZONES,
AND THE 1988 PROCLAMATION
The history of the territorial sea and other ocean zones
parallels the history of nations' desire to control their marine
resources and coastal waters. Since 1793, the territorial sea of
the United States has been delimited at three miles from the
shores of coastal states.22 In 1988, President Ronald Reagan
extended the territorial sea to twelve miles for the purpose of
national security, in accordance with the limits outlined in UN-
CLOS 111.23 Control over the territorial sea zone essentially
entails complete sovereignty over its resources and absolute
rights to explore and exploit the waters and ocean floor within
that zone. 4 Coupled with this sovereignty is responsibility to
protect and to prevent pollution of the marine environment
within the territorial sea.25
A. History and Status of UNCLOS III
Prior to UNCLOS III, the United Nations attempted to
codify a territorial sea limit at Geneva in 1958 ("UNCLOS
I")2'6 and again in 1960 ("UNCLOS II"').217 Both attempts
22. Letter from Secretary of State Thomas Jefferson to British Minister Mr.
Hammond (Nov. 8, 1793), reprnted in I J. MOORE, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
702-03 (1906). Mr. Jefferson reported that
[t]he President of the United States, thinking that, before it shall be finally
decided to what distance from our shores the territorial protection of the
United States shall be exercised ... finds it necessary in the meantime to fix
provisionally on some distance for the present government of these ques-
tions .... Reserving, however, the ultimate extent of this for future deliber-
ation, the President gives instructions to the officers acting under his au-
thority to consider those heretofore given them as restrained for the present
to the distance of one league or three geographical miles from the sea-
shores.
Id.
23. Proclamation, supra note 9. President Reagan's purpose in extending the
territorial sea was to "advance the national security and other significant interests of
the United States." Id.
24. UNCLOS III, supra note 1, arts. 2-4, 21 I.L.M. at 1272.
25. Id. art. 192, 21 I.L.M. at 1308.
26. Convention of the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone, Apr. 29, 1958, 15
U.S.T. 1606, 516 U.N.T.S. 205 [hereinafter UNCLOS I].
27. U.N. Conference on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone, U.N. Doc. A/
CONF.13/C.I/SR.I to SR.66, A/CONF.13/C.I/L.l to L.168 (1960) [hereinafter
UNCLOS II]. UNCLOS II came very close to a solution on the territorial sea, but it
adjourned without coming to an agreement. THOMAS J. SCHOENBAUM, ADMIRALTY
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failed to produce a multilateral agreement on the limits of the
territorial sea.2 UNCLOS I resulted in four treaties dealing
with the law of the sea that did not resolve the problem of the
territorial sea limit: the Convention on the Territorial Sea and
the Contiguous Zone,29 the Convention on the Continental
Shelf,3 0 the Convention on the High Seas, 3' and the Conven-
tion on Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources of
the High Seas. 3 2 Unfortunately, none of these treaties re-
solved the territorial sea limit issue. UNCLOS III is the result
of twelve years of U.N. conferences and codifies much of what
participating nations consider to be customary international
law of the sea.33 A uniform boundary for the territorial sea was
finally agreed upon in UNCLOS III," which provides that
coastal nations may exercise sovereignty over a territorial sea
of up to twelve miles, but that nations must always preserve the
right of "innocent passage" for non-national ships." UN-
CLOS III defines a passage as "innocent" as long as it does not
prejudice the peace, good order, and security of the coastal
state. UNCLOS III, however, specifically excludes submarines
and aircraft from this right of passage. 6
AND MARITIME LAw 22 (1987). A U.S.-Canada proposal to create a six-mile territorial
sea combined with a fishery zone of an additional six miles failed to pass one vote shy
of a two-thirds majority vote. CUYVERS, supra note 3, at 150; see D.W. Bowett, The
Second United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, 9 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 415 (1960)
(analyzing UNCLOS II).
28. SCHOENBAUM, supra note 27, at 22.
29. Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone, supra note 26.
30. Convention on the Continental Shelf, Apr. 29, 1958, 15 U.S.T. 471, 499
U.N.T.S. 311.
31. High Seas Convention, supra note 18.
32. Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources of the
High Seas, Apr. 29, 1958, 17 U.S.T. 138, 559 U.N.T.S. 285.
33. MANGONE, supra note 20, at 40; see ROSENNE, supra note 6, at 14 (defining
customary international law).
34. UNCLOS III, supra note 1, arts. 2-3, 21 I.L.M. at 1272.
35. Id.; see CUYVERS, supra note 3, at 154 (discussing right of innocent passage).
36. UNCLOS III, supra note 1, art. 19, 21 I.L.M. at 1274. The right of innocent
passage is almost entirely subject to the discretion of the coastal state. BERNARD H.
OXMAN, LAW OF THE SEA: U.S. POLICY AND DILEMMA 153-54 (1983). Passage of a
non-resident vessel is considered prejudicial to the peace, good order, or security of
a coastal state if it engages in any one of 12 enumerated activities including "any
activity having a direct bearing on passage." Id. The right of innocent passage
through straits used for international navigation is derived from the Corfu Channel
(U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. 4 (Apr. 9); see generally John N. Moore, The Regime of Straits
and the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, (discussing right of innocent
passage and UNCLOS III); 74 AM. J. INT'L L. 77 (1980); W. Michael Reisman, The
1992-1993] U.S. TERRITORIAL SEA EXTENSION
UNCLOS III is also a comprehensive legal work that in-
cludes directives for international cooperation regarding con-
servation and management of living resources, 3 7 prevention of
pollution, 8 and comprehensive international environmental
law. 9 Under UNCLOS III, nations have the obligation to pro-
tect and to preserve the marine environment 4° and can be held
liable for failure to fulfill their obligations. 41 Nations are also
obliged to take measures to reduce pollution from all sources
to the fullest extent possible, including land-based sources,
sea-bed activities, dumping, and pollution to the atmosphere
or from vessels.4 2 Furthermore, nations must outline plans
designed to prevent marine collisions and deal with emergen-
cies that may occur during the operation of vessels, installa-
tions and other devices used for exploration.43
Under the High Seas Convention of 1958, ratified by the
United States, there is a duty to create laws to protect against
marine pollution from seabed exploration.44 Of the general
regional treaties that exist concerning the marine environ-
ment, a major focus is on the pollution resulting from ships45
and from dumping. 46 Under UNCLOS III, every nation has a
Regime of Straits and National Security: An Appraisal of International Law-making, 74 AM.J.
INT'L L. 48 (1980) (discussing right of innocent passage).
37. UNCLOS III, supra note 1, art. 242, 21 I.L.M. at 1316.
38. Id. arts. 275-277, 21 I.L.M. at 1321.
39. Id. arts. 192-196, 21 I.L.M. at 1308.
40. Id. art. 192, 21 I.L.M. at 1308.
41. UNCLOS III, supra note 1, art. 235, 1, 21 I.L.M. at 1315. The obligation
to prevent marine pollution includes areas even beyond a nation's official sovereign
jurisdiction. UNCLOS III, supra note 1, art. 194, 2, and art. 195, 21 I.L.M. at 1308.
42. UNCLOS III, supra note 1, pt. XII, § 5-6, arts. 207-22, 21 I.L.M. at 310-14.
43. UNCLOS III, supra note 1, art. 194, 3, 21 I.L.M. at 1308.
44. High Seas Convention, supra note 18, art. 24, 13 U.S.T. at 2318, 450
U.N.T.S. at 96.
45. See International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships
[hereinafter MARPOL] reprinted in 12 I.L.M. 1319 (1973) (requiring new tankers over
70,000 deadweight tons to segregate ballast tankers so that oil and water will never
mix in such vessels and also setting maximum standards for discharge of oil by tank-
ers). MARPOL is intended to apply to the discharge of most "harmful substances"
from vessels. Id. at 1319. Not included in the definition of discharge is the release of
harmful substances resulting from the extraction and processing of seabed mineral
resources, and the release of harmful substances in relation to scientific research into
pollution control. Id. at 1320-21.
46. See International Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by
Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter, opened for signature December 29, 1972, 26
U.S.T. 2403, T.I.A.S. No. 8165 (incorporating provisions of regional convention on
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duty to harmonize their marine pollution policies with other
signatories.47 Thus, a standardized multilateral marine envi-
ronmental protection policy is the ultimate goal of UNCLOS
III and its signatories.48
The United States was among the nations that voted
against adoption of UNCLOS III but confined its objection to
the Deep Seabed Mining provisions of the Convention. 49 The
same subject signed in Oslo, 1972, forbidding dumping of certain toxic substances,
like mercury, cadmium, DDT, or PCB's, into sea).'
At the regional level, however, there are a number of treaties involving sources
of marine pollution within a single region. See, e.g., Convention for the Conservation
of the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden Environment, 1982, reprinted in NEw DIRECTIONS
(Simmonds loose-leafed. 1983), Doc.J. 19; Convention for the Protection and Devel-
opment of the Marine Environment of the Wider Caribbean Region, Cartagena 1982,
NEW DIRECTIONS, supra, Doc. J. 17; Convention for the Protection of the Marine Envi-
ronment and Coastal Area of the South-East Pacific, Lima 1981, NEW DIRECTIONS,
supra, Doc. J. 18; Convention for the Co-operation on the Protection and Develop-
ment of the Marine and Coastal Environment of the West and Central African Re-
gion, Abidjan 1981, NEW DIRECTIONS supra, Doc. J.4; Kuwait Regional Convention
for Co-operation on the Protection of the Marine Environment from Pollution, April
24, 1978, reprinted in 17 I.L.M. 511 (1978); Convention for the Protection of the Med-
iterranean Sea against Pollution, Feb. 16, 1976, reprinted in 15 I.L.M. 290 (1976); and
the Convention on the Protection of the Marine Environment of the Baltic Sea Area,
Helsinki, Mar. 22, 1974, reprinted in 13 I.L.M. 546 (1974) (exemplifying regional
agreements).
In the north-east Atlantic and North Sea, there is no single framework conven-
tion, but a number of agreements have been adopted that involve cooperation
among certain nations in oil pollution emergencies, dumping, pollution from land-
based sources and liability for pollution resulting from sea-bed activities. See, e.g.,
International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage resulting from
Exploration for, or Exploitation of, Submarine Mineral Resources, London 1977, re-
printed in 6 NEw DIRECTIONS IN THE LAW OF THE SEA 535 (Churchill, Nordquist & Lay
eds. 1977); Convention for the Prevention of Marine Pollution from Land-based
Sources, June 4, 1974, reprinted in 13 I.L.M. 352 (1974); Convention for the Preven-
tion of Marine Pollution by Dumping from Ships and Aircraft, Oslo 1972, reprinted in
11 I.L.M. 262 (1972) and the Agreement for Cooperation in Dealing with Pollution
of the North Sea by Oil, Bonn, June 9 1969, reprinted in 9 I.L.M. 359 (1969) (exempli-
fying additional regional agreements).
47. UNCLOS III, supra note 1, arts. 192, 194(1), 21 I.L.M. at 1308.
48. Id.
49. See 18 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 887 (July 9, 1982) (setting forth President
Reagan's announcement ofJuly 9, 1982 citing reasons why United States did not sign
U.N. Convention of Law of the Sea, adopted by Third U.N. Conference on Law of
Sea on April 30 1982); see also Kathryn Surace-Smith, United States Activity Outside of the
Law of the Sea Convention: Deep Seabed Mining and Transit Passage, 84 COLUM. L. REV.
1032 (1984)(discussing U.S. disagreement with deep seabed provisions of UNCLOS
III); SHIGERU ODA, INTERNATIONAL CONTROL OF SEA RESOURCES xvii-xxii (1989) (set-
ting forth history of U.S. policies toward UNCLOS I, UNCLOS II, and UNCLOS III).
The deep seabed is technically called "The Area" and defined in UNCLOS III as
the "seabed and ocean floor and subsoil thereof beyond the limits of national juris-
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developing countries' unilateral economic interests in the
Deep Seabed Mining Provisions of UNCLOS III caused the
United States and other industrialized democracies to reject
the Convention when it was opened for signature in December
of 1982. The United States did not sign UNCLOS III because
the sea-bed provisions of the Convention were perceived as
fundamentally contrary to the economic and political philoso-
phy of Western capitalistic democracies.5"
Despite this controversy, one commentator argues that
there is an emerging concept that UNCLOS III is, in principle,
two treaties. 5' The first treaty is the Law of the Sea, comprised
of the provisions of UNCLOS III that involve sea-fishing, navi-
gation, shipping, pollution control, marine research, and the
like.5 2 These provisions generally are non-controversial and
diction." UNCLOS III, supra note 1, art. 1, 1, 21 I.L.M. at 1272. Therefore, a
position in favor of international control over the ocean bed gained support among
the developing nations. ODA, supra note 49, at xxvi. These opposing interests under-
lay the deliberations on the subject of the deep ocean floor, which continued in U.N.
discussions toward the end the 1960's and beginning of the 1970's. Id.
50. OXMAN, supra note 36, at 6. Certain provisions called for mandatory tech-
nology transfer from developed countries to developing countries, and an equitable
allocation of property claims of discovered resources among all signatories, both rich
and poor. Id. at 6. Critics opposed to the Deep Seabed Mining provisions contend
that the internationalist ideology of the "common heritage" is founded on wishful
thinking, Third World avarice, and a serious philosophical misunderstanding of
property rights and of the true common heritage of humanity. Id. at 59-75. Critics of
the U.S. opposition to the Convention argue that the goals of international equity
and community were compromised by the egocentric, nationalistic demands of pow-
erful, capitalistic countries like the United States. Id. at 13-25.
Critics of the Deep Seabed Mining Provisions of UNCLOS III argue that the
attempt to regulate undersea resources as the "Common Heritage of Mankind" is a
Third World ploy. Id. at 44-55. The "Third World", commonly known as the Group
of 77, consists of more than 77 of the poorest nations in the world from Africa, Asia,
South America and Middle America. Id. The Group of 77 ultimately seeks to trans-
fer wealth from the West to eradicate poverty on a world-wide basis and establish
minimum standards of living for all people. Id. at 45 (citing President Julius Nyerere
of Tanzania in Peter Bauer &John O'Sullivan, Ordering the World About: The New Inter-
national Economic Order, 1 POLIcy REV. 56 (1977)).
The Seabed Mining Provisions of UNCLOS III furnished the opportunity to
bridge the gap between the rich and poor countries. OXMAN, supra note 36, at 47.
The "ploy" was to permit Third World countries to reap the profits from industrial-
ized countries' efforts at deep seabed exploration. Id. at 6. In particular, production
limitation, mandatory transfer of some technologies, and a built-in preference for
public over private enterprise of deep seabed mining went against U.S. and industri-
alized countries economic interests. Id.
51. OXMAN, supra note 36, at 59-75.
52. Id.
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accepted by all nations, including the United States.5" The
other treaty is the Law of the Seabed, which consists of the
Deep Seabed Mining provisions at issue.5 4 The view of UN-
CLOS III as two treaties found support when President Rea-
gan announced that the United States would not sign the Con-
vention, but stressed that most of the provisions concerning
"Law of the Sea" were consistent with U.S. interests and the
interests of all nations and that the United States would ob-
serve them, reciprocally, in a bi-lateral context with other na-
tions. 55 Furthermore, the United States treats UNCLOS III as
a restatement of customary international law except for the
provisions on deep seabed mining. 56 Currently, fifty-six na-
tions have ratified UNCLOS III, with only four additional sig-
natures needed for the Convention to come into effect.57
B. Maritime Zones
A significant part of UNCLOS III dealt with the limitation
and extension of maritime zones. 58  Although land areas and
53. SCHOENBAUM, supra note 27, at 23.
54. OXMAN, supra note 36, at 59-75.
55. Id. at 61.
56. MALONE, FREEDOM & OPPORTUNITIES: FOUNDATION FOR A DYNAMIC OCEANS
POuCY, DEP'T ST. BULL., Dec. 1984, at 76.
57. Telephone interview with the United Nations, supra note 4. One hundred
and seventeen nations signed the convention at Montego Bay, Jamaica on December
10, 1982. OXMAN, supra note 36, at 7. The great majority of these signatories were
developing countries, however, Australia, Canada, Denmark, France, Greece, Ire-
land, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, the Soviet Union, and China were also origi-
nal signatories. Id. at 7. Belgium, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy and the
United Kingdom joined the United States in not signing the convention because of
concerns over the deep seabed mining provisions. Id. Japan has since ratified the
Convention. Id. Sixty signatories are necessary to bring UNCLOS III into effect.
Nandon Speech, supra note 5. Fifty-six nations have signed UNCLOS III as of Au-
gust 1993, leaving only four more ratifications necessary. Telephone interview with
the United Nations, supra note 4.
On July 9, 1982 President Reagan announced that the United States would not
sign the Convention. 18 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 887 (July 9, 1982); ARND
BERNAERT, BERNAERT'S GUIDE TO THE LAw OF THE SEA 12 (1988). The key concern of
the United States, Great Britain, West Germany, and France was to ensure the access
of their nationals to deep sea mining, to avoid any deterrence to mining, and to pre-
vent the monopolization of the resources by the Sea-Bed Authority authorized under
UNCLOS Il. UNCLOS III, supra note 1, art. 150, 21 I.L.M. at 1295. Later, certain
problem fields such as tuna fishing, under art. 64, and the compulsory transfer of
deep sea mining technology under Annex III, were also criticized. BERNAERT'S
GUIDE TO THE LAW OF THE SEA, supra at 12.
58. UNCLOS III, supra note 1 at arts. 2-4, 33, 21 I.L.M. at 1280, 1294.
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the airspace above them are primarily under the complete and
unconditional sovereignty of individual nations, the oceans of
the world are under varying levels of sovereignty.59 In the sea,
a number of zones exist over which states exercise varying de-
grees of jurisdiction.60 The territorial sea, the contiguous
zone, and the exclusive economic zone are all defined in UN-
CLOS III with suggested boundary delimitations.6 1
1. The Territorial Sea
The relationship between the territorial sea zone,62 under
the complete sovereignty of a state and the "high seas," 63 the
ocean beyond the jurisdiction of a particular state, has con-
cerned coastal nations throughout history. 6 Thomas Jeffer-
son, as Secretary of State to George Washington, first ex-
pressed the United States' adoption of a three-mile limitation
59. KAMAL HOSSAIN & SUBRATA R. CHOWDHURY, PERMANENT SOVEREIGNTY OVER
NATURAL RESOURCES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW ix (1984). The principle of permanent
sovereignty over natural resources is a fundamental concept in contemporary inter-
national law. Id. It is extensively utilized by nations in support of actions concerning
the exploitation of natural resources in their territory. Id. The natural wealth and
resources located within the territory of a nation belongs to the community, and no
other outside nation. Id.
60. See KAPOOR, supra note 8, at 25-27 (listing various zones referred to in arti-
cles of UNCLOS III).
61. UNCLOS III, supra note 1, arts. 2-4, 33, 56, 21 I.L.M. at 1280, 1294, 1286.
62. See supra note 1 (defining territorial sea).
63. UNCLOS III, supra note 1, pt. VII, 21 I.L.M. at 1286-92. The high seas are
the ocean spaces beyond the jurisdiction of coastal states, the waters adjacent to the
sea-bed, the ocean surface, and the atmosphere above. Id. This zone covers almost
half the planet's surface. Id.
64. D.P. O'CONNELL, INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA 9-10 (1982). The distinc-
tion between ocean space under a nation's sovereign power and ocean-waters beyond
any such control is found as early as the third century B.C. in the Roman law concept
of mare liberum ("free sea"). Id. Gradually, the doctrine of mare clausum ("closed sea")
developed as certain maritime nations unilaterally asserted jurisdiction over areas of
the sea in an attempt to protect their developing commercial interests. Id. at 1-20.
Few nations questioned the right of a coastal state to defend itself and to exer-
cise dominion over some portion of the sea adjacent to its coastal shores. Id. Corne-
lius van Bynkershock, in his 1703 treatise, De Domino Maris Disertatio, suggested that
the distance a cannon shot would travel from shore was an appropriate measure of
the coastal state's jurisdiction over the sea. PHILIP C. JESSUP, THE LAw OF TERRITO-
RIAL WATERS AND MARITIME JURISDICTION 5-6 (1927). The cannon-shot measure, cal-
culated at a marine league, the equivalent to three geographical miles from shore by
the Italian jurist Galiani in 1782, gained support until it was universally accepted as
the maximum distance over which a coastal state could claim sovereignty. Id.
12191992-1993]
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in a 1793 letter.65 Over 100 years later, Jefferson's letter influ-
enced the U.S. Supreme Court to adopt the three-mile limit for
the U.S. territorial sea.66 The United States relied upon such
delimitation for almost 200 years until President Reagan's
1988 decision to expand the U.S. territorial sea to twelve
miles .67
Attempts to define the limits of the territorial sea failed at
The Hague in a League of Nations sponsored effort in 19306"
and at the United Nations' First and Second Geneva Conven-
tions in 195869 and 1960,70 respectively. Consequently, the
territorial sea remained at three nautical miles for the United
States. 71 Actual national practice, however, had already begun
to diverge from this limit. 72 The inability to reach an interna-
tional consensus on the territorial sea limit did not mean that
the three-mile limit remained customary international law.73
Some European nations always asserted six or nine miles terri-
torial seas. By 1960, at UNCLOS II, many nations unilaterally
claimed a twelve-mile limit.74  Other nations, like Argentina,
Peru, and Chile, claimed sovereignty over coastal waters out to
200 miles shortly after 1945 having been spurred into this by
the United States' Continental Shelf Proclamation. This how-
65. See supra note 22 (quoting Thomas Jefferson's-letter regarding adoption of
marine league).
66. See Cunard Steamship Co. v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 100 (1923) (adopting three-
mile territorial sea limit).
67. Proclamation, supra note 9; see Ocean Bounday Expands: U.S. Policy, L.A.
TIMES, Dec. 28, 1988, at 1, [hereinafter L.A. TIMES] (citing reasons for Proclamation
that were given by Assistant White House Press Secretary Robert Hall).
68. Acts of the Conference for the Codification of International Law, 1 LEAGUE NATIONS
O.J. 123-37, 165-69 (1930). In 1930, the League of Nations discussed the three-mile
territorial sea limits at the Conference for the Codification of International Law at
The Hague. CUYVERS, supra note 3, at 148. The Conference was unsuccessful in its
attempt to codify the law of the sea, but served a useful function in identifying and
defining many issues that were to grow in importance in international law. Id.
69. UNCLOS I, supra note 26; see Phillip Jessup, The United Nations Conference on
the Law of the Sea, 50 COLUM. L. REV. 234 (1959) (giving history and analysis of UN-
CLOS I).
70. UNCLOS II, supra note 27.
71. Lewis M. Alexander, The Ocean Enclosure Movement: Inventory & Prospect, 20
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 561, 567 (1983).
72. Arruda, supra note 2, at 709.
73. DEPT. OF STATE, 1988 DIGEST OF UNITED STATES PRACTICE IN INTERNATIONAL
LAw, ch.7; § 3 [hereinafter DIGEST].
74. Arruda, supra note 2, at 709.
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ever, had no effect on the territorial sea. 75 Even the United
States began to view the three-mile ocean area as inadequate
to protect the quality of the seas in which the United States had
an interest.76 Many nations felt that the three-mile limit was
inadequate because there was simply not enough fish, oil, or
gas to be allocated authoritatively within such a relatively small
limit. 7" Thus, the three-mile territorial sea delimitation, previ-
ously considered customary law by most nations, actually was
highly suspect by the time of UNCLOS I's entry into force in
1963.78
2. The Contiguous Zone
The contiguous zone is derived from the long-established
concept that coastal states have the right to take additional
measures of control over ocean space beyond the territorial
sea.79 A U.S. contiguous zone has been recognized for cus-
toms purposes since the late eighteenth century.80 According
75. Id.
76. Id. at 704-05. In accordance with the 1954 Oil Pollution Convention, Con-
gress extended the area covered by the 1924 Oil Pollution Act from three to fifty
miles and prohibited tankers from discharging oil or wastes in that area. Oil Pollu-
tion Act, Pub. L. No. 87-167, 75 Stat. 402, 404 (1961). The United States, in 1966,
expanded its fishing zone from three to twelve miles to protect against non-U.S. fish-
ing in U.S. waters. Act of Oct 14, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-658, § 2, 80 Stat. 908 (1967).
In 1976 Congress extended its controls over coastal fisheries to 200 miles, suppos-
edly in conformity with the 200 mile Exclusive Economic Zone of UNCLOS III. The
Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-265, § 402(a), 90
Stat. 331, 360. These measures, however, do not provide the broad powers allowa-
ble in the territorial sea. Arruda, supra note 2, at 705. Within the territorial sea,
states may regulate matters including fisheries, coastal trade, police, pilotage, and
usage of channels. Id.
77. M. JANIS, SEA POWER AND THE LAW OF THE SEA 89 (1976).
78. Arruda, supra note 2, at 704-06.
79. BERNAERT'S GUIDE TO THE LAW OF THE SEA, supra note 57, at 112. Smuggling
was one of the earliest concerns of eighteenth century nations with powerful naval
forces. Id. In 1736, Great Britain implemented an act against smuggling, claiming
jurisdiction in such cases for a distance of up to 24 nautical miles. Id. The United
States, in 1935, established a customs enforcement area of fifty nautical miles to en-
force its liquor legislation. Id. The concept of a contiguous zone emerged at the
1958 UNCLOS I Convention in an attempt to provide protection for states that
wanted additional jurisdiction for national security reasons. Id.
80. UNCLOS I, supra note 26, 15 U.S.T. 1606, 516 U.N.T.S. 205. Eighty-six
nations participated in this convention and codified much of the traditional law of the
sea, which had developed as customary law over the centuries. CUYVERS, supra note
3, at 149-50. UNCLOS I divided the oceans into various zones including the territo-
rial sea, the contiguous zone, and new concepts such as the continental shelf, which
1221
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to UNCLOS III, a coastal state may claim as its contiguous
zone a zone adjacent to the territorial sea extending to a maxi-
mum of twenty-four miles from the baseline, which is an artifi-
cial line from which all marine zones are measured."' The
breadth of the contiguous zone itself depends on the distance
proclaimed for a nation's territorial sea.82 Currently, the U.S.
contiguous zone stands between the three and twelve mile
mark because the 1988 Proclamation does not extend the con-
tiguous zone nor has Congress enacted legislation extending
this zone to date.83
A coastal nation exercises rights of "prevention" in the
contiguous zone, to prevent infringements of customs, fiscal,
immigration, or sanitary laws in the territorial sea.84 To pre-
vent such infringements, a coastal nation may authorize board-
ing and searching, and even prohibit foreign or domestic ves-
sels from entering the territorial sea, subject to a right of inno-
cent passage.85 Rights of "extended power" that apply to a
nation's criminal law come into effect if there has been an in-
fringement of any of the laws listed above within the territory
were all codified in international treaty law. UNCLOS I, supra, arts. 1-3, 16, 24, 15
U.S.T. at 1608, 1611-13, 516 U.N.T.S. at 206-08, 216, 220. Currently, the continen-
tal shelf of a coastal nation is the natural extension of seabed and subsoil of the
submerged areas that extends beyond its territorial sea to a depth of 200 meters
unless the technology will permit a greater length. UNCLOS III, supra note 1, art.
76, 21 I.L.M. at 1285. The coastal nation may exercise sovereign rights over the
natural resources and other nations may not exploit the shelf without the express
consent of the coastal nation. UNCLOS III, supra note 1, art. 77, 21 I.L.M. at 1285.
The 1958 Conference however failed to resolve the controversies over the breadth of
the territorial sea and the exclusive fishing zones. CUYVERS, supra note 3, at 150.
81. UNCLOS III, supra note 1, art. 33, 2, 21 I.L.M. at 1276. The coastal state
must determine its own baseline, normally the low-water line along the coast, or in
the case of an island or atoll, the seaward low-water line of any reef. BERNAERT, supra
note 57, at 26.
82. UNCLOS III, supra note 1, art. 33, 21 I.L.M. at 1276.
83. See supra note 9 and accompanying text (reflecting 1988 Proclamation's
claim of territorial sea expansion without, however, mentioning the contiguous
zone).
84. UNCLOS III, supra note 1, art. 33, 1(a), 21 I.L.M. at 1276. The author of
this Note uses the term "prevention" to describe the right to stop vessels or persons
within the contiguous zone from entering the territorial sea zone that would other-
wise be violating U.S. customs, immigration, fiscal and sanitary laws. Though "pre-
vention" may prove burdensome, the practice ultimately prevents infringements of
U.S. laws.
85. Id. The concept of innocent passage in the territorial sea has been consider-
ably altered in UNCLOS III by a long list of activities which are non-innocent during
territorial sea passage. See id. art. 19, 21 I.L.M. at 1274.
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or territorial sea of the coastal nation. s6 Thus, a coastal nation
may have the right to pursue an offending vessel into the con-
tiguous zone and enforce its national criminal law for a crime
committed within the territorial sea zone. 7
3. The Exclusive Economic Zone
The need for a contiguous zone has become questionable
in recent years due to an emerging concept called the exclusive
economic zone ("EEZ").88 The EEZ is a zone beyond and ad-
jacent to the territorial sea, in which the coastal state possesses
sovereign rights to explore, exploit, conserve, and manage its
86. UNCLOS III, supra note 1, art. 33, l(b), 21 I.L.M. at 1276. The author of
this Note uses the term "extended" power to define the expansion, or enlargement
of a nation's right to enforce its national laws on any party within the contiguous
zone whenever the latter has violated any of the laws listed in UNCLOS III and the
violation occurs within the nation's territory or territorial sea zone.
87. UNCLOS III, supra note 1, art. 111, 21 I.L.M. at 1210. The rights of non-
nationals in the contiguous zone of a state are affected by coastal states' formal proc-
lamation to the international community that a contiguous zone is established. Id.
Full navigation rights are retained if compatible with UNCLOS III, supra note 1,
arts. 58, 87-115, 21 I.L.M. at 1279, 1286-90. Navigation rights are restricted under
art. 33, which permits a coastal nation to board and search a vessel only to prevent
and punish infringement of specific coastal state laws. UNCLOS III, supra note 1, art.
33, 21 I.L.M. at 1276. Navigation of non-national vessels is also limited in this zone
by requiring the approval of the coastal state for removal of historical and archaeo-
logical objects. Id. art. 303, 2, 21 I.L.M. at 1326.
Under art. 33, non-nationals must observe sanitary laws of the coastal state and
pollution laws applicable in the exclusive economic zone [hereinafter EEZ]. Id. art.
194-196, 21 I.L.M. at 1308.
The contiguous zone also denies non-nationals any mining rights (art. 76 3)
and fishing rights (exceptions are found in art. 62, 2) in these waters. Id. art. 246,
21 I.L.M. at 1317. In addition, the coastal state's consent is required for scientific
research when an EEZ has been established. Id. art. 246, 21 I.L.M. at 1317.
88. UNCLOS III, supra note 1, arts. 55-75, 21 I.L.M. at 1274-85. The concept of
the exclusive economic zone [hereinafter EEZ] provided for in UNCLOS III was not
present in UNCLOS I or UNCLOS II. ODA, supra note 49 at xiii. The term "EEZ"
first appeared in a proposal by the Government of Kenya at the Asian-African Legal
Consultative Committee annual meeting in 1972. Id. (citing Asian-African Legal
Consultative Committee, Report of the Thirteen Session, 1972, at 155, held in Lagos,
Nigeria from January 18th to 25th 1972). The initial concept of an EEZ suggested
placing fisheries within 200 miles from a coastal state in that nation's exclusive juris-
diction. Id. The idea was quickly codified in UNCLOS III, with initial strong reserva-
tions from certain geographically disadvantaged nations which did not have broad
fishery zones. ODA, supra note 49 at xx; Proclamation No. 5030, 48 Fed. Reg. 10,605
(1983) [hereinafter EEZ Proclamation]. President Reagan issued a proclamation in
1983 establishing a 200-mile exclusive economic zone. Id. In the EEZ, a coastal na-
tion may "assert certain sovereign rights over natural resources and related jurisdic-
tion." Id.
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natural resources, whether living or non-living, of the seabed,
subsoil, and superadjacent waters.89 A coastal state also has
powers related to artificial installations, marine scientific re-
search, and marine environment protection. 90 UNCLOS III
gives coastal states the right to establish an EEZ of 200 nautical
miles from the baseline of that state by proclamation.9
The EEZ, which emerged from UNCLOS III, is an estab-
lished institution of international law. 92 Yet the EEZ remains
ambiguous in interpretation, and gives rise to problems in its
application.93 For example, it is still unclear whether a nation
must assert affirmatively the creation of an EEZ or whether an
EEZ exists automatically by mere operation of law.94
Many of the same rights granted in the contiguous zone,
including jurisdiction with respect to customs, fiscal, health,
safety, and immigration laws, are granted in the EEZ.95 The
contiguous zone has independent legal status as long as the
coastal state has not declared any exclusive economic zone that
exceeds the outer limits of the contiguous zone.9 6 If an exclu-
sive economic zone is established, it begins beyond and adja-
cent to the territorial sea.97 Thus, the contiguous zone is part
of the exclusive economic zone, and all provisions that apply to
the latter also apply completely in the contiguous zone.98
89. UNCLOS III, supra note 1, art. 56 1, 21 I.L.M. at 1279.
90. Id.
91. Id. arts. 5-16, 57, 21 I.L.M. at 1272-73, 1280. Note that depending on the
structure of the continent, it is possible that the coastal state area may extend to 350
miles from the baseline.
92. ODA, supra note 49, at xx.
93. Id.
94. Shigeru Oda, Fisheries under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea,
77 AM.J. INT'L L. 739 (1983).
95. OXMAN, supra note 36, at 153-54. The rights of a coastal state in the EEZ
include the exclusive sovereign rights to explore, exploit, conserve, and manage the
living and nonliving natural resources of the waters, seabed and subsoil; the exclusive
sovereign rights to control other activities for the economic exploration of the zone,
such as the production of energy from the water, wind, and currents; the exclusive
sovereign rights to control the construction and use of all artificial islands or installa-
tions such as oil rigs or offshore tanker depots; the right to be informed, approve of,
and participate in scientific marine research; the right to control dumping of wastes;
and the right to board, inspect and arrest a merchant ship suspected of illegally dis-
charging pollutants in the contiguous zone under certain circumstances. Id. at 153-
54.
96. UNCLOS III, supra note 1, art. 57, 21 I.L.M. at 1280.
97. OXMAN, supra note 36 at 154.
98. UNCLOS III, supra note 1, art. 55, 21 I.L.M. at 1279. The principle of free-
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President Reagan, in 1983, signed Proclamation No. 5030,
which claimed that the United States had a sovereign right to
control exploitation over a 200-mile EEZ.99 The United States
is one of ten countries that has gained the largest EEZ because
of its geography. 00 Currently, over 60 nations, including the
United States claim an EEZ equal to 200 nautical miles.' 0'
Although the EEZ is one of the most important aspects of UN-
CLOS III, the concept is still somewhat controversial. 0 2 The
U.S. Congress, however, fully recognizes the EEZ Proclama-
tion as establishing a U.S. EEZ of 200 nautical miles. 1 3
C. The 1988 Proclamation: Effects on U.S. Sovereignty and U.S.
Statutes Untouched by the Proclamation
1. The 1988 Proclamation and Constitutional Issues
In 1988, President Reagan, acting under his constitutional
authority as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces and in
accordance with international law, extended the territorial sea
to twelve nautical miles under Proclamation No. 5928.104 Pres-
ident Reagan claimed that the expansion of the territorial sea
was necessary to advance national security and other interests
of the United States. 0 5 It also allowed the United States to
join the overwhelming number of other nations claiming the
twelve-mile limit,' 0 6 and to comply with the suggestion of UN-
dom of navigation applies in this zone as well as outside the territorial sea. Id. art.
58, 21 I.L.M. at 1280, and art. 87, 21 I.L.M. at 1286. Other states should respect the
rights of a coastal state in the exclusive economic zone and comply with its laws and
regulations. Id. art. 58, 3, 21 I.L.M. at 1280.
99. EEZ Proclamation, supra note 88; see BROWN, supra note 3, at 133-52 (dis-
cussing exclusive economic zone). Considerable interest has developed in the poten-
tial of the sea's mineral resources. CUYVERS, supra note 3, at 51. Exploitation of
marine minerals has been made possible by the growth in science and technology.
Id. Estimates range from the billions to trillions of tons of unexploited marine min-
erals. Id. Currently, exploitation has been confined primarily to the continental shelf
areas. See supra note 80 (defining continental shelf); see generally CUwERS, supra note
3, at 52-66 (setting forth history and regulations of marine mineral development).
100. CUYVERS, supra note 3, at 157.
101. KAPOOR, supra note 8, at 8.
102. CuVEas, supra note 3, at 156.
103. See, e.g., H.R. 393, 103d Cong., 1st Sess., at 1 (1993) (citing Congress' rec-
ognition of U.S. EEZ, as established by the EEZ Proclamation).
104. See supra note 9 and accompanying text (setting forth 1988 Proclamation).
105. 1988 Proclamation, supra note 9.
106. DIGEST, supra note 73. In 1988, the Department of State reported that 104
nations claimed a territorial sea breadth of 12 miles, and only 12 nations, including
1992-1993] 1225
1226 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LI WJOURNAL [Vol. 16:1208
CLOS III that all nations conform to the twelve-mile limit. 107
The 1988 Proclamation distinguished between an interna-
tional boundary where U.S. sovereignty ends and a boundary
that determines property rights between the U.S. federal and
state governments.' 8 State property boundaries are presently
at the three-mile mark for most U.S. states under the 1953
Submerged Lands Act (the "SLA"). 0 9 The 1953 SLA grants
ownership to U.S. coastal states over the submerged lands
from the shoreline out to three nautical miles for all U.S.
coastal states except Texas, Louisiana, and the gulf coast of
Florida where the boundaries are nine miles. 110
The 1988 Proclamation did not amend or alter the SLA,
but did extend the U.S. sovereignty boundary from three to
twelve miles for international purposes."' The 1988 Procla-
mation grants the United States complete sovereignty twelve
miles from its coast, against any other nation."l2 This sover-
eignty includes jurisdiction over the airspace, sea, seabed, and
subsoil.' 13
The Justice Department has questioned the legality of the
President's power to claim territory without the consent of
Congress." 4 Under art. IV, § 3(2) of the U.S. Constitution,
the United States at that time, retained a three-mile territorial sea. Id. Six nations
claimed a breadth of more than three but less than 12 miles, and 22 claimed territo-
rial sea limits ranging from 15 to 200 miles. Id. In addition, 40 nations claimed
contiguous zones beyond their territorial seas, 37 of which were beyond 12 miles. Id.
Only two of the 37 states claimed contiguous zones exceeding 24 nautical miles. ld;
see supra notes 79 to 87 and accompanying text (defining contiguous zone).
107. See L.A. TIMES, supra note 67 (citing reasons for 1988 Proclamation that
were given by Assistant White House Press Secretary Bob Hall).
108. 1988 Proclamation, supra note 9. The 1988 Proclamation states that
"[n]othing in this Proclamation: (a) extends or otherwise alters existing Federal or
State law or any jurisdiction, rights, legal interests, or obligations derived there-
from[.]" Id.
109. Submerged Lands Act, 43 U.S.C § 1301-1303, 1311-1315 (1988) [hereinaf-
ter SLA].
110. See United States v. Louisiana, 363 U.S. 1 (1960) (approving nine-mile
boundaries for coast of Louisiana); United States v. Florida, 363 U.S. 121 (1960)
(approving nine-mile boundaries for Florida).
111. See supra note 9 and accompanying text (setting forth 1988 Proclamation).
112. Id.; see supra note 59 and accompanying text (defining sovereignty).
113. 1988 Proclamation, supra note 9.
114. H.R. REP. No. 102-843, pt.(I), 102d Cong., 2d Sess., at 9-10 (1991). In
1991, the Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries reported that the President
alone may not have the power to acquire new territory for the United States. Id.
"The most extensive acquisitions of territory by the United States have been accom-
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Congress has the power to make all laws concerning the terri-
tory belonging to the United States." 5 A legal opinion from
the Justice Department indicated that the President's constitu-
tional authority to assert sovereignty over an area, an act that
international law would define as acquisition of territory, was
open to some question under art. IV, § 3(2) of the U.S. Consti-
tution.1 16 To resolve these constitutional questions, various
bills attempting to enact the 1988 Proclamation into U.S. fed-
eral law have been presented before Congress." 17
There are many differences between the 1988 Procla-
mation extending the territorial sea to twelve miles and a con-
gressional enactment that does the same. In contrast to a con-
gressional enactment, the 1988 Proclamation does not affect
existing federal or state laws because the President's constitu-
tional authority to expand the territorial sea is based solely on
his role as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces." 8
Therefore, national security is the only permissible basis for
the 1988 Proclamation's expansion of the territorial sea." 9
Over seventy-five federal statutes contain the term "terri-
plished through the use of the treaty-making power. By treaty, the United States
acquired the Louisiana Purchase, the Gadsden Purchase, the Oregon Territory, Cali-
fornia, Alaska, the Panama Canal Zone, and the Virgin Islands. In all these instances,
the Senate had to give its advice and consent. The only instance in which the Presi-
dent, acting alone, acquired new territory for the United States were the acquisitions
of a few small islands in the Pacific Ocean." Id.
115. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3(2). Article IV, § 3(2) states that "[tihe Congress
shall have Power to dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regulations respect-
ing the Territory or other Property belonging to the United States; and nothing in
this Constitution shall be so construed as to Prejudice any Claims of the United
States, or of any particular State." Id.
116. H.R. REP. No. 102-843, pt.(I), 102d Cong., 2d Sess., at 9-10 (1991). In
modern international law, there is a key difference between assertion of sovereignty,
and assertion ofjurisdiction. Assertion of sovereignty transforms the territorial sea
into part of the actual territory of the United States as much as a piece of land. Id. at
9 n.l.
Assertion of jurisdiction, on the other hand, concerns the United States' inher-
ent power to enforce its laws within that specific area of the sea. See id.
117. See supra note 11 and accompanying text (listing several proposed bills
struck down in Congress since 1988).
118. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2(1). The U.S. Constitution states that "[t]he Presi-
dent shall be Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, and of
the militia of the several States, when called into the actual service of the United
States[.]" Id. In addition, "[tihe United States shall guarantee to every State in this
Union a Republican Form of Government, and shall protect each of them against
Invasion[.]" U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4.
119. Id.
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torial sea" or rely on the concept of a territorial sea zone. 2 0
The geographical definition of the territorial sea is essential to
determine at what point federal statutes apply to any party or
vessel entering the territorial sea zone. Only if a congressional
bill is passed defining the territorial sea as twelve miles will any
U.S. statute be applicable out to the twelve-mile boundary.
2. U.S. Federal Statutes Involving the Territorial Sea
Untouched by the 1988 Proclamation
Numerous examples of federal statutes that would be af-
fected by a congressional expansion of the territorial sea zone
exist and incorporate various subjects such as marine preserva-
tion and protection, vessel operations, and litigation of admi-
ralty claims.1 21 Currently, the status of the territorial sea for
the purposes of these federal statutes still remains at three
miles because the 1988 Proclamation did not automatically
amend the breadth of the territorial sea for U.S. domestic stat-
utes. 1
22
Federal statutes concerning marine environmental protec-
tion are plentiful. The Act to Prevent Pollution from Ships
("APPS") concerns the disposal of garbage into ocean wa-
ters. 123 Under the APPS, certain restrictions apply to the dis-
charge at sea of garbage generated during the operation of
vessels. 12 4 This statute, among many others, applies to waters
under U.S. sovereignty and therefore applies to waters within
the U.S. territorial sea zone. 25 The Shore Protection Act of
120. H.R. REP. No. 102-843, pt.(I), 102d Cong., 2d Sess., at 10 (1991).
121. See H.R. REP. No. 102-843, pt.(I), 102d Cong., 2d Sess., at 16 (1991) (list-
ing examples of federal statutes affected by congressional expansion of territorial
sea).
122. 1988 Proclamation, supra note 9; see supra note 108 (quoting 1988 Procla-
mation).
123. Act to Prevent Pollution from Ships, 33 U.S.C. § 1901-1912 (1988 & Supp.
III 1991).
124. H.R. REP. No. 102-843, pt.(I), 102d Cong., 2d Sess., at 17 (1991). All dis-
charges of plastic are prohibited. Id. at 19. Dunnage and similar packing materials
may be discharged, but not closer than twenty-five nautical miles from the nearest
land. Id. In addition, food wastes and paper products may be discharged, but not
closer than twelve miles from the nearest land. Id. Food waste that has been finely
ground however, may be disposed of three miles outward from land. Id.
125. See The Marine Protection, Research and Sanctuaries Act of 1972, 16
U.S.C. § 1431 (1988) (exemplifying additional federal regulations protecting marine
environment to be affected by congressional expansion of territorial sea); the Ocean
Dumping Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1401 (1988 & Supp. III 1991) (requiring permits for
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1988 is another statute involving marine environmental pro-
tection affected by the definition of the territorial sea. 126 The
Shore Protection Act protects against illegal discharges of gar-
bage from all vessels operating in U.S. coastal waters. 127 Also,
the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 protects U.S. territorial waters
from oil spills caused by vessels or facilities containing oil.' 28
An example of a federal statute concerning vessel opera-
tions that would be amended by a congressional expansion of
the territorial sea is the Prohibitions of Foreign Vessels Act.12 9
This statute excludes non-U.S. vessels from conducting wreck-
ing operations within the territorial waters of the United States
unless given specific permission by the U.S. government.'
Moreover, any collision damage to U.S. and non-U.S. vessels
within the territorial sea is subject to U.S. Coast Guard admin-
istrative hearings. 131 This statute applies in U.S. waters only,
dumping any material transported from outside United States into U.S. territorial sea
or contiguous zone, if it affects territorial sea).
126. Shore Protection Act, 33 U.S.C. § 2609(d) (1988).
127. Id.
128. Oil Pollution Act, 33 U.S.C. § 2701 (Supp. I 1990).
129. Prohibitions of Foreign Vessels Act, 46 U.S.C. § 316(d) (1988).
130. Prohibitions of Foreign Vessels Act, 46 U.S.C. 316(d) (1988). Wrecking is
the business of saving ships, cargo and persons that are presently in danger. In re
Andrews, 266 F. Supp. 162 (M.D. Fla. 1967). Any wrecker operates on an implied
contract with the rescued vessel and expects compensations for its salvage services.
Id. The purpose of excluding non-U.S. vessels from conducting wrecking operations
is to protect the U.S. wrecking industry from the adverse economic effects of allowing
non-U.S. vessels to participate in the business. See Christopher J. Foreman, Omnibus
Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988: Putting the Brakes on Foreign Investment, 19 GA. J.
INT'L & CoMP. L. 175, (1989) (setting forth U.S. protective policies against non-U.S.
parties who profit from U.S. industries including shipping industry).
131. 33 C.F.R. § 1.01-20 (1992). The Coast Guard has the authority to inspect
vessels within the U.S. territorial waters for compliance with laws and regulations
regarding safe construction, equipment, manning and operations of any vessel, and
to conduct investigations of marine casualties and accidents. Id. Vessel operations
and anchorage grounds are controlled by the Rivers and Harbors Appropriations Act
of 1915. Rivers and Harbors Appropriations Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 471-476 (1988). This
statute grants the Secretary of Transportation, acting through the Coast Guard, au-
thority to establish areas for U.S. and non-U.S. vessels to anchor in all U.S. territorial
waters. Id.
Vessel safety is addressed by requiring all vessels entering U.S. waters at the
territorial sea boundary line to comply with the Vessel Bridge-to-Bridge Radiotele-
phone Act. Vessel Bridge-to-Bridge Radiotelephone Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1203 (1988 &
Supp. 11 1990). This statute enables the Coast Guard to require radio telephones on
all covered vessels, domestic and foreign, thereby enhancing navigational safety. Id.
Another statute concerning vessel operations includes the Ports and Waterways
Safety Act which grants the Coast Guard authority to establish vessel operating re-
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and is enforceable solely within the territorial sea, as defined
by Congress.
In the maritime litigation area, Rule E(3) (a) of the Supple-
mental Rules for Certain Admiralty and Maritime Claims
would also be affected by a congressional expansion of the
U.S. territorial sea.'1 2 This rule provides that process in rem'3 3
and maritime attachment 34 shall be served only within the fed-
eral district that the vessel is in, which can extend only as far as
U.S. sovereignty extends. 3 5 Until recently, service of process
has generally been upheld when it is made within the three
mile zone. The three mile zone is the property boundary of
the state in which the federal district court is located. 36 Thus,
it is unclear whether service of process will now extend out to
twelve miles, or remain at the three mile zone. 3 7 These stat-
utes all exemplify federal acts that depend on a concept of "the
territorial sea," which will be amended if a congressional ex-
pansion of the territorial sea is passed.' 8
quirements, including vessel traffic controls, for all U.S. and non-U.S. vessels within
the territorial sea. Ports and Waterways Safety Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1222 (1988). In
addition, federal statute grants authority to the Coast Guard to control and assess
penalties against all vessels operating negligently in U.S. waters. 46 U.S.C. § 2301
(1988).
132. Supplemental Rules for Certain Admiralty and Maritime Claims, 98 F.R.D.
374-80 (1985) [hereinafter Rules].
133. NICHOLAS J. HEALY AND DAVIDJ. SHARPE, ADMIRALTY CASES AND MATERIALS,
118 (2d ed. 1986). An action in ren connotes that a ship can be named as sole de-
fendant in a complaint. Id. In essence, a vessel takes on a personification itself. Id.
Thus, the ship is arrested by a U.S. marshal, defaulted, tried, found at fault, and sold
at auction to cover damages all without the active participation of the shipowner in
personam. Id.
134. Id. at 856. Attachment occurs when a defendant cannot be found within
the district for personal service of process consisting of complaint and summons
under Fed.R.Civ.P. 4. Id. A U.S. marshall executes a process of maritime attachment
upon property of the defendant in the possession of the defendant or in the custody
of defendant's agent within the district, and brings the property into the custody of
the district court. Id.
135. See supra note 59 and accompanying text (setting forth powers of nations
within their sovereign territory).
136. Rules, supra note 132; SLA, supra note 109.
137. See Rules, supra note 132 (setting forth that service of process must be
within federal district in which suit in admiralty is commenced).
138. See supra notes 123-32 and accompanying text (discussing federal statutes
that use the term "territorial sea").
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3. Federal Versus State Conflict Over Property Rights of
Submerged Lands Unresolved by the 1988
Proclamation
Because the 1988 Proclamation did not address the issue
of property ownership rights of the newly expanded zone be-
tween three and twelve miles, a congressional bill redefining
the term "territorial sea" for U.S. domestic law must resolve
this issue. t1 9 The struggle between the U.S. federal govern-
ment and individual states for ownership of oil, gas, and min-
eral rights located in coastal ocean floors has a long and formi-
dable history. 140 Following World War II, President Harry S.
Truman issued a Proclamation claiming, on behalf of the U.S.
federal government, the natural resources of the continental
shelf.' 4' The continental shelf was defined at the time as that
part of the ocean floor that promises to be exploitable now or
in the future. 142 Thus, originally the United States, instead of
its individual states, claimed jurisdiction over the submerged
lands that were thought to be rich in mineral resources, and
shallow enough to be exploitable by present-day and future
technology. 14 3
139. See 1988 Proclamation, supra note 9 (stating Proclamation does not amend
existing federal or state law). The issue carries major fiscal concerns. Glass, supra
note 17. The U.S. Minerals Management Service estimated that 25 percent of U.S.
unleased oil resources, or about 2-4 billion barrels, and 20 percent of unleased gas
resources, or 9-18 trillion cubic feet, lie in the 3-12 mile portion of the proposed
territorial sea. Id. The transfer of those lands to the states would cause the federal
government to incur losses of $2-4 billion in cash bonuses, $8-16 billion in royalties,
and $58-116 billion in gross market value of oil and gas leases. Id.
140. Edward A. Fitzgerald, New South Wales v. Commonwealth: The Australian Tide-
lands Controversy, 14 Loy. L.A. Irr'L & CoMp. L.J. 25 (1991). The United States, Can-
ada and Australia have all experienced conflict between the federal and state govern-
ments regarding jurisdiction over offshore submerged lands rich in petroleum re-
sources. Id. at 86.
141. Proclamation No. 2667, 10 Fed. Reg. 12,303 (1945). In 1945, President
Truman issued two proclamations relating to the continental shelf. Proclamation No.
2667, 10 Fed. Reg. 12,303 (1945); Proclamation No. 2668, 10 Fed. Reg. 12,304
(1945). One asserted U.S. jurisdictional rights over the natural resources of the sea-
bed and subsoil of the continental shelf. Proclamation No. 2667, supra. The other
claimed authority of the United States to establish conservation zones in high seas
waters contiguous to the U.S. coastline and to unilaterally regulate the fishing activi-
ties of U.S. nationals (non-U.S. nationals would be regulated by agreements with
their states). Proclamation No. 2668, supra. See ODA, supra note 49, at 147 (discuss-
ing Truman Proclamation in detail).
142. ODA, supra note 49, at 147.
143. Id.
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In the wake of the Truman Proclamation, the state and
federal governments increasingly disagreed over the owner-
ship of the submerged lands.1 44 States pushed for broader ju-
risdiction to explore the resource-rich ocean area adjacent to
their coasts.' 45 The U.S. Supreme Court, beginning in 1947,
handed down a series of decisions ruling that the federal gov-
ernment, rather than the individual states, had paramount
rights in the resources of the seabed and over the territorial
sea. 146
Congress responded to these decisions with two signifi-
cant pieces of legislation that were signed into law in 1953.147
The first legislation, the Submerged Lands Act ("SLA") 41
vested in the states the ownership of the submerged land
within the boundaries of the respective states, limited to three
geographical miles into the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans and
nine geographical miles into the Gulf of Mexico. 49 Congress'
second enactment, The Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act
("OCSLA"), 5 0 reaffirmed the Truman Proclamation of 1945,
asserting federal supremacy over the seabed and subsoil of the
remainder of the continental shelf. 5 '
In 1954, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the SLA and em-
phasized that the federal government had "paramount rights,"
equivalent to property rights, over offshore submerged
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19 (1947). The first jurisdictional con-
flict occurred in the United States when the U.S. government brought suit against the
state of California, challenging California's assertion of title to off-shore lands be-
yond the low-water mark. Id. The U.S. Supreme Court, focusing on the interna-
tional aspects of the conflict, declared that the federal government's sovereign inter-
ests in navigation, national defense, international relations, and commerce estab-
lished paramount rights over the submerged lands. Id. at 29. One aspect of these
paramount rights was dominion over the resources located in the submerged lands.
Id. at 29-4 1. The U.S. Supreme Court's decision was historically inaccurate and con-
fused property rights, which were determined by domestic law, with sovereignty,
which was determined by international law. Id. at 43-44 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
See United States v. Texas, 339 U.S. 707 (1950) and United States v. Louisiana, 339
U.S. 699 (1950)(adopting paramount rights rationale).
147. ODA, supra note 49, at 147.
148. SLA, supra note 109.
149. Id.
150. Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1343 (1988).
151. Id.; see Robert B. Krueger, The Background of the Doctrine of the Continental Shelf
and the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, 10 NAT. RESOURCES J. 442 (1970).
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lands. 152 Congress could relinquish to the states the federal
government's property rights over the submerged lands with-
out interfering with U.S. national sovereign interests.' The
Supreme Court held that jurisdiction over offshore lands was a
domestic dispute over the congressional disposition of prop-
erty. 154 Most importantly, the Court recognized that private
property rights and national sovereignty could be separated. 155
Thus, property rights over offshore submerged lands was a
completely separate issue from the federal government's sov-
ereignty and right to claim the lands as U.S. territory against
the rest of the world.15
6
In the mid-1960s, property rights over this area became a
growing concern within the United States because technologi-
cal achievements in the United States reached a level where
prospects for exploration of off-shore oil fields began to gener-
ate wide-spread interest.' 57 At the same time, the United
States also was involved in a controversy with the states over
the extent of U.S. fishery rights in its coastal waters. 15  The
1988 Reagan Proclamation made no mention of ownership
over the newly expanded three to twelve mile zone, leaving
this critical issue for Congress to resolve.' 59
Since the Proclamation's enactment, certain states that
currently have control over oil and gas rights within the three
mile mark have argued for an expansion of these rights out to
the twelve mile mark.'60 The authority that has jurisdiction
over the territorial sea zone, whether it be the U.S. federal gov-
152. Alabama v. Texas, 347 U.S. 272, 274 (1954).
153. Id. at 274.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. ODA, supra note 49, at 147.
158. Id. at 40. Fishing rights concern a coastal nation's exclusive right to fish in
a given area. Id. at 40-55. Approximately 90 percent of all fishing zones, "fisheries",
come under national jurisdiction, many of them extending to 200 miles from shore.
Id. at 50. The enclosure of exclusive fishing areas does not necessarily result in opti-
mal exploitation or equitable allocation of the ocean's food resources: Id.
159. Proclamation, supra note 9. The Congress alone has the power to dispose
of and make all regulations respecting the territory or property belonging to the
United States. U.S. CoNsT. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.
160. Glass, supra note 17. California, Florida, Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama,
and Texas are among those states with an interest in expanding state jurisdiction out
to twelve miles. Id.
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ernment or the individual states, is also obligated to protect
that portion of the sea against marine pollution.' 6 ' If state
control is extended, individual U.S. states would be financially
and legally responsible for pollution control and clean up
within their specific state boundaries to twelve miles, which
could logically result in varying degrees of marine protection
throughout the United States.162 UNCLOS III, however, em-
phasizes the need for harmony and uniformity among nations
in their environmental legislation.163
II. FEDERAL VERSUS STATE CONTROVERSY OVER
PROPERTY RIGHTS OF SUBMERGED LANDS
By July 1988, months before the 1988 Proclamation ex-
tending the territorial sea was issued, the twelve-mile limit had
gained a great deal of support in the U.S. Congress.'64 Since
1988, in an attempt to address questions concerning President
Reagan's authority to proclaim a U.S. territorial sea limit of
twelve miles, Congress has sought to affirm the Presidential
Proclamation by codifying the extension of the territorial sea
to twelve miles in U.S. federal statutes. 65 Supporters of fed-
eral jurisdiction over the expanded area have introduced legis-
lation that would not amend the Submerged Lands Act,
thereby preserving federal control over this area.' 66 This type
161. UNCLOS III, supra note 1, arts. 275-277, 21 I.L.M. at 1321.
162. See High Seas Convention, supra note 18 (setting forth responsibility of na-
tions to protect against pollution of marine environment).
163. UNCLOS III, supra note 1, art. 194, 21 I.L.M. at 1308. UNCLOS III states
that nations shall take all measures necessary to prevent, reduce, and control pollu-
tion of the marine environment from any source, and shall endeavor to harmonize
their policies in this connection. Id.
164. H.R. 5069, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1988). This bill attempted to extend the
territorial sea out to 12 miles. Id. Although H.R. 5069 died in the Senate, it received
enough votes to pass the House of Representatives. Arruda, supra note 2, at 713.
165. H.R. 1405, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989). In March of 1989, H.R. 1405 was
introduced into Congress, which would not only have affirmed the President's
twelve-mile territorial sea proclamation, but also would have established that the au-
thority of any federal agency and the legal rights or authority of the states would not
be extended beyond their previous geographical limits by the extension of the U.S.
territorial sea. Id. This bill was not passed. Arruda, supra note 2, at 707.
166. Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone Act [hereinafter the "Jones Bill"],
H.R. 3842, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991). The Jones Bill is an example of a recent
proposal in the 102nd Congress and was introduced by the late Representative Wal-
ter Jones of North Carolina. Id. By the end of the 102nd Congress, the Jones bill
was not yet voted on, therefore requiring reintroduction in the 103rd Congress. Bill
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of legislation would amend approximately seventy-five existing
federal statutes, 67 extend the U.S. territorial sea to twelve
miles, expand the U.S. contiguous zone from twelve to twenty-
four nautical miles, and maintain federal jurisdiction over the
three to twelve mile zone.' 68  Some states, however, do not
agree that the federal government should control the three to
twelve mile zone.' 69 These states support legislation that will
amend the SLA in order to grant individual states complete
property rights over the area extending out twelve miles from
the coastline. 70
Tracking Report, H.R. 3842, 102d Cong. 1st Sess. (1991) available in LEXIS, BLTRK
file.
167. H.R. REP. No. 102-843, pt. (I), 102d Cong., 2d Sess., at 15-2 1. Among the
federal statutes that may be amended under the opinion of the Committee on
Merchant Marine and Fisheries, Foreign Affairs, and the Judiciary are the Endan-
gered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. § 1532 (1988) (stating amendment enables
seizure of illegally imported endangered species and products upon entry into 12-
mile territorial sea of United States); Antarctic Marine Resources Convention Act, 16
U.S.C. § 2432 (1988) (clarifying existing definition of 'import' to enable seizures of
illegally taken Antarctic marine living resources upon entry of non-U.S. vessel into
12-mile territorial sea of United States); Fur Seal Act of 1966, 16 U.S.C. § 1151
(1988) (stating amendment enhances enforcement of Fur Seal Act by enabling
seizures of illegally taken fur seals upon entry of non-U.S. vessel into 12-mile territo-
rial sea of United States); Lacey Act Amendments of 1981, 16 U.S.C. § 3371 (1988)
(stating amendment increases enforcement authority of federal government in cases
of illegally taken fish or wildlife imported into 12-mile zone); Northern Pacific Hali-
but Act of 1982, 16 U.S.C. § 773 (1982) (clarifying that United States can enforce
restrictions of this fishery law within limits of its extended territorial sea); Magnuson
Fishery Conservation and Management Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1801 (1988 & Supp. III
1991) (stating that amendment retains existing state and federal management juris-
diction over fishery resources on continental shelf, enhances U.S. ability to enforce
management measures of this major fishery law within 12-mile territorial sea, and
clarifies that state fishery jurisdiction only extends to pockets of water within state
boundaries); The Atlantic Tunas Convention Act of 1975, 16 U.S.C. § 971 (1988)
(clarifying that prohibited importation takes place at new 12-mile territorial sea limit,
and that inner boundary of Atlantic tuna fishery zone is coextensive with inner
boundary of exclusive economic zone, consistent with Magnuson Act); North Pacific
Fisheries Act of 1954, 16 U.S.C. § 1021 (1988) (stating that amendment allows en-
forcement authority for this Act to be consistent with territorial sea extension and
Magnuson Act), and the Whaling Convention Act of 1949, 16 U.S.C. § 916 (1988).
168. See, e.g., Jones Bill, supra note 166 (maintaining federal jurisdiction).
169. See supra note 160.
170. Coastal States Extension Act of 1991, H.R. 536, 102d Cong., 1st Sess.
(1991) [hereinafter the "Bennett Bill"]. This act would have amended the Submerged
Lands Act to extend from three miles to twelve miles the territorial sea boundaries of
the coastal states, the Great Lakes states, and the Gulf of Mexico states. Id. By the
end of the 102nd Congress, the Bennett Bill was not voted on, thereby requiring a
reintroduction in the 103rd Congress. Bill Tracking Report, H.R. 536, 102d Cong.
1st Sess. (1991) available in LEXIS, BLTRK file.
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A. Endorsement of Federal Jurisdiction Over the Three to
Twelve Mile Zone
Presently, under the OCSLA' 7 ' and the Exclusive Eco-
nomic Zone, the U.S. government has complete control and
jurisdiction over the submerged lands and the ocean space
from the three-nautical miles boundary out to 200-nautical
miles for the purposes of artificial installations, marine scien-
tific research, and marine environment protection. 72 The U.S.
federal government, under the Bush administration, strongly
supported complete federal control over the submerged lands
between three and twelve miles from shore, primarily because
of the estimated US$136 billion in potential revenue from oil
and gas exploitation. 173 In addition, supporters of federal ju-
risdiction believe that enactment of legislation supporting state
control, rather than federal control, would change existing and
carefully balanced federal-state responsibilities for resource
management. 17
4
TheJones Bill, introduced on November 22, 1991 by Rep-
resentative Walter Jones of North Carolina and not enacted by
the end of the 102nd Congressional Session, exemplified the
Bush administration's position. 75 The bill would have ex-
tended the territorial sea from three to twelve miles, extended
the contiguous zone from twelve to twenty-four miles, and
maintained federal control over the new area. 176 As this bill
did not amend the SLA, which supplies individual states with
control over the first three miles from the coastline, individual
states would have retained control over the first three miles
out from shore. 1 77 The Jones Bill, backed by the Bush admin-
171. Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, supra note 150.
172. See BROWN supra note 3, at 133-52 (discussing EEZ).
173. Glass, supra note 17.
174. Id. The dividing line between the states and federal government with the
extended territorial sea would remain intact through the Submerged Lands Act. 43
U.S.C. §§ 1301-1303, 1311-1315 (1988 & Supp. III 1991). With the exception of
Texas and the gulf coast of Florida and Louisiana, which have a 3-marine league or 9-
mile seaward boundary, all states have a 3-mile limit. Id. Within this limit, the states
own and regulate offshore resources, including oil, gas and fish. Id. Beyond this
boundary, the federal government, under the SLA, has exclusive jurisdiction and
management responsibility. Id.
175. Jones Bill, supra note 166.
176. Id.
177. Id.
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istration, triggered a dispute in the U.S. Congress over the
control of mineral rights and oil leasing rights for the ex-
panded area. 78  The House Committee on Merchant Marine
and Fisheries 79 issued a report on August 12, 1992 favoring
adoption of the Jones Bill with various amendments. 80 Under
the proposed amendments, a congressional enactment of the
1988 Proclamation would have extended federal powers of en-
forcement concerning numerous federal statutes by redefining
the terms "territorial sea" and "high seas" in light of the new
boundary line of twelve miles.' Consequently, any federal
statute listed in the Jones Bill that included the phrase "territo-
rial seas," or that concerned the importation of goods into the
"jurisdiction of the United States" would have been redefined
to acknowledge the extension of the territorial sea.18 2 By the
178. Glass, supra note 17.
179. 137 CONG. REC. H10,841 (1992). On November 21, 1991 the Jones Bill
was referred to three House committees for further study; the House Merchant
Marine and Fisheries Committee, the House Foreign Affairs Committee, and the
House Judiciary Committee. Id. The House Merchant Marine and Fisheries Com-
mittee held a hearing in February of 1992. 138 CONG. REC. D65 (1992). The
Merchant Marine and Fisheries Committee ordered, reported, and amended the
Jones Bill in April 1992. 138 CONG. REC. D427 (1992). The Committee reported in
the House, and amended the Jones Bill in August 1992. 138 CONG. REC. H8143
(1992).
180. H.R. REP. No. 102-843, pt. (I), 102d Cong., 2d Sess., at 1. The Merchant
Marine and Fisheries Committee found it in the interest of the United States to ex-
tend its territorial sea to 12 nautical miles to protect offshore resources, to establish a
contiguous zone of 24 miles for the further protection of its territory, and to apply
federal law to the maritime zone between 3 and 12 nautical miles. Id. at 1.
181. See supra note 167 and accompanying text (listing major federal statutes
amended through domestic enactment of Proclamation No. 5928).
182. H.R. REP. No. 102-843, pt. (I), 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1991). Therefore,
the term "import" would be defined in light of the new territorial sea extension out
to twelve miles, whether or not it would be so defined by the customs laws of the
United States. Id. at 3.
The Jones Bill also resolved a conflict between the International Convention on
the Prevention of Pollution from Ships ("MARPOL Annex V") (33 C.F.R. pts. 151,
155, and 158) (1992), the Act to Prevent Pollution from Ships ("APPS") (Pub. L. No.
96-478, 94 Stat. 2297 (1980), 33 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1911) (1988 & Supp. III 1991), and
the Ocean Dumping Act ("ODA") (33 U.S.C. § 1401 (1988 & Supp. III 1991). All
three agreements pertain to the disposal of waste material into ocean waters. H.R.
REP. No. 102-843, pt. (I), 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1991) at 17. Under MARPOL Annex
V and APPS, certain restrictions apply to the discharge at sea of garbage generated
during the operation of vessels. Id. at 17. These restrictions include provisions
prohibiting discharge of dunnage and similar packing materials not closer than 25
miles from shore, the discharge of food wastes and paper products closer than 12
miles from shore, and the discharge of finely ground food waste closer than 3 miles
from shore. Id. The ODA requires permits for dumping any material transported
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end of 1992, the Jones Bill had not been enacted.' Due to
the considerable support for the Jones Bill in 1992, however, a
similar bill is very likely to be reintroduced during the 103rd
Congress in 1993.184
B. Endorsement of State Jurisdiction Over the Three to
Twelve Mile Zone
Several states have objected to federal control over the
three to twelve mile zone and instead, advocate state control
over the zone.18 5 Since the 1988 Proclamation extending the
from outside the United States into the U.S. territorial sea or contiguous zone, if it
affects the territorial sea. Id. Under a literal reading of the ODA, the term "territo-
rial sea" and "contiguous zone" would have been expanded to twelve and twenty-
four miles respectively by the Jones' bill. Id. Accordingly, no person would be able
to transport material, including garbage, from outside the United States into the
twelve-mile territorial sea or the twenty-four mile contiguous zone and discharge it
without an EPA permit. Id. Vessels would no longer be allowed to discharge food
wastes and paper products inside the contiguous zone as they are currently permitted
to do. Id.
The Merchant Marine and Fisheries Committee proposed to resolve this conflict
by allowing food wastes and other material lawfully discharged under MARPOL and
APPS to continue to be "dumped" inside the contiguous zone, provided the dis-
charge is in compliance with MARPOL and APPS, and regardless of an Environmen-
tal Protection Agency permit, which is currently required under the Ocean Dumping
Act. Id.
If a vessel entering U.S. waters is not fully in compliance with MARPOL and
APPS and illegally discharges material in those waters, the vessel may be subject to
penalties and sanctions under the Ocean Dumping Act. Id. Under the Jones Bill,
these penalties would not have been duplicative of those assessed under APPS, be-
cause the penalties assessed pursuant to APPS would control in the event that both
Acts apply. Id.
183. Bill Tracking Report, H.R. 3842, available in LEXIS, Legis. Library,
BLT102 file.
184. See Billcast, Bill No. H.R. 3842 102d Cong. 1st Sess. available in LEXIS,
Legis. Library, BLCAST file (indicating 97 percent approval forecast in House Com-
mittee on Foreign Affairs, House Committee on Judiciary, 92 percent approval rate
in Senate Committee, 96 percent approval rate in House and 88 percent approval
rate in Senate). Daniel Yergin, Clinton's Oil Policy Will Cater to Environment, Hous.
CHRON., Jan. 14, 1993, at A21 (2 Star ed.) The Clinton administration will stress
environmental issues, with a renewed emphasis to restore vitality to the U.S. domes-
tic oil and gas production industry, which lost half a million jobs since 1980. Id. Pro-
tecting the environment is expected to become a dominant factor in carrying out
federal governmental policy. Brad Knickerbocker, Clinton Actions on Environment Will
Be Tested Against Promises, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Jan. 12, 1993 at 13. President
Clinton is expected to support efforts to protect coastal areas from industrial uses
such as off-shore oil drilling. Andrea Shalal-Esa, Environment, Energy High on Clinton's
Priority List, REUTERS, Jan. 15, 1993 available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, CURRNT file.
185. Sheryl Morris, House Legislation Revives Debate Over States' Offshore Jurisdiction,
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territorial sea to twelve miles for "sovereignty" purposes,"18
several states have shown great interest in amending the SIA
to extend state property rights from three to twelve miles.'17
California and Alaska protested soon after the 1988 Proclama-
tion because they believed that individual state authority
should be extended to the new twelve-mile boundary.' 88 Many
of the states desiring to extend property rights out to twelve
miles are environmentally protective of their coastal waters
and have criticized the Bush administration for emphasizing oil
and gas drilling, rather than increasing conservation and at-
tempts at renewable and alternative energy sources.'8 9 States
have also cited state expertise in ocean resource management
as a reason to allow them control over and beyond the territo-
rial sea.' 90 Moreover, certain states have become increasingly
strident about protecting their shores, while other states are
more open to leasing their submerged lands to oil and gas de-
Inside Energy/with Federal Lands, Jan. 28, 1991 at 14, available in LEXIS, Nexis Li-
brary, INERGY File.
186. See supra note 9 and accompanying text (setting forth Proclamation); see also
note 59 and accompanying text (defining sovereignty).
187. Morris, supra note 185, at 14.
188. Id.
189. Sheryl Morris, Interior's New OCS Plan Draws Mostly Criticism from Coastal
States, INSIDE ENERGY/WITH FEDERAL LANDS, May 6, 1991 at 9, available in LEXIS,
Nexis Library, INERGY file. States like California and Florida vigorously oppose
most federal plans for oil development off its beaches and want adequate environ-
mental studies done before any development takes place. Id.
North Carolina Governor James Martin criticized the Bush administration for
not choosing North Carolina as an "environmentally sensitive area" for special stud-
ies and protection when President Bush decided in 1990 to defer some sales and
leasing of several coastal states' submerged lands. Id.
Louisiana criticizes the federal government's control over offshore leasing activi-
ties because it requires Louisiana to share the risk of offshore pollution, while al-
lowing an "unjust distribution" of offshore development when compared with other
states. Id.
Ten of the 23 lease sales scheduled in a 1991 federal government plan are in the
Western and Central Gulf of Mexico. Id. Despite Louisiana's criticism of the federal
government, it is a state more open to leasing, along with Mississippi, Alabama, and
Texas. Id.
190. See Hearing on the Presidential Proclamation Extending the United Stats Territorial
Sea Before the Subcomm. on Oceanography and Great Lakes of the House Comm. on Merchant
Marine and Fisheries, 101 st Cong., 1 st Sess. 12 (1989) (setting forth statement of Chris
Safer, Chairman of the Coastal States Association).
The case of the Great Lakes states is an example of state competence. Id. Great
Lakes states have successfully and exclusively managed the aquatic resources over
water areas ranging from twenty-one to more than seventy-two miles of state territo-
rial water boundaries. Id.
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velopers.' 9 ' Thus, if a congressional expansion of the territo-
rial sea occurs, ownership of the submerged lands will be of
vital importance to the federal and state governments as well
as the U.S. oil and gas industry.1 92
The Bennett Bill,' 93 introduced on January 16, 1991 by
Representative Charles Bennett of Florida and not enacted by
the end of the 102nd Congressional Session, is representative
of the position supporting individual state jurisdiction for the
newly extended territorial sea area between the three and
twelve mile boundary lines.' 94 The Bennett Bill proposed the
exact opposite of the Jones Bill on the state sovereignty is-
sue.' 95 Instead of preserving federal jurisdiction over the ex-
panded zone, the Bennett Bill would have added nine miles to
most state jurisdictions, thereby extending state sovereignty to
twelve miles.' 96 Extending state sovereignty in this area, as the
Bennett bill proposed, would result in a shift of control of oil
and gas development and revenues from the federal govern-
ment to the individual states. 97
The Bush administration vigorously opposed the Bennett
Bill because of its proposed sweeping changes to established
federal-state boundaries, with far-reaching financial, energy,
and national security ramifications.' 98 The Bush administra-
tion believed that any attempt by coastal states to extend their
jurisdiction would affect offshore oil leasing, drilling and de-
velopment. 99 Although the Bennett Bill was not enacted by
the close of the 102nd Congress, the issue continues to be of
great concern to the oil and gas industries.200
191. Morris, supra note 185, at 14.
192. Id.
193. Bennett Bill, supra note 170.
194. Id.
195. Id. The Bennett Bill would have amended the Submerged Lands Act to
extend the territorial sea boundaries of the coastal states, the Great Lake states, and
the Gulf of Mexico states from three nautical miles to twelve nautical miles. Id. at 3-
4.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. See supra note 139 and accompanying text (setting forth financial estimates
of up to U.S. $136 billion in losses to federal government if submerged lands were
transferred to states by amending SLA).
199. Id.
200. Bill Tracking Report on H.R. 536, H.R. 3842, 102d Cong. 1st Sess. (1991)
available in LEXIS, Legis Library, BLTRK file. Congress has yet to pass a bill deter-
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III. EFFECTS OF THE 1988 PROCLAMA TION AND U.S.
LEGISLATION EXPANDING THE U.S. TERRITORIAL SEA
EXTENSION ON THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY AND
RESOLVING THE PROPERTY RIGHTS CONTROVERSY
Congressional legislation extending the territorial sea is
necessary to allow the United States to enforce federal statutes
within its own territory. A congressional extension of the terri-
torial sea to twelve miles, however, will directly impact a multi-
tude of statutes regulating marine preservation, vessel safety,
and vessel operations of both U.S. and non-U.S. flag vessels.2 0 '
This U.S. legislation should also resolve the controversy sur-
rounding control of the submerged lands between three and
twelve miles from shore and should codify federal control over
the area.
A. Proclamation No. 5928 Extended U.S. Sovereignty but Does Not
Address Property Rights of Submerged Lands
The effects of a U.S. territorial sea extension on the inter-
national community are two-fold. First, the primary purpose
of the Proclamation is to claim U.S. sovereignty and jurisdic-
tion over its coastal waters to twelve miles as against the rest of
the world. °2 The 1988 Proclamation, in effect, advances U.S.
national security. 2 3 It protects U.S. coastlines by keeping
non-U.S. submarines, aircraft, and military ships further away
from the coast.2 0 4 Moreover, a congressional bill extending
the territorial sea would, in essence, redefine the meaning of
"territorial sea," "navigable waters," and "high seas" in every
federal statute cited in that congressional bill.20 5
The 1988 Proclamation's authority is based solely on the
President's executive power derived from the U.S. Constitu-
mining whether the federal or state government should control this area and a simi-
lar bill advocating state control may be introduced in the 103rd Congress in 1993.
Id.
201. See supra note 167 and accompanying text (setting forth list of federal stat-
utes that would most likely amended by congressional enactment).
202. See supra note 23 and accompanying text (stating 1988 Proclamation's main
purpose is to advance U.S. national security).
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 102-843, pt. (I), 102d Cong., 2d Sess., at 2-7 (rede-
fining "territorial sea" as described in Proclamation No. 5928).
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tion206 and extends U.S. sovereignty to twelve nautical miles
from U.S. coastlines as against all other nations of the
world.2 0 7 Although the official reason given for the twelve-
mile Proclamation was to "advance national security, ' 2 0 8 Presi-
dent Reagan did not specifically state how the new twelve-mile
limit would advance national security. Certain nations believe
that a twelve-mile limit better protects the coastline of a nation
by keeping foreign submarines, ships, and aircraft farther out
from shore than the three-mile limit.2 0 9
The 1988 Proclamation assures to non-U.S. ships a right
of "innocent passage" through the United States' territorial
sea as stated in UNCLOS 111.210 Thus, although the 1988
Proclamation extends U.S. sovereignty to twelve miles, the in-
ternational shipping industry is not affected because merchant
ships come under the "innocent passage" exception. UN-
CLOS III states that passage of a foreign ship in a nation's ter-
ritorial waters will be innocent as long as its activity is directly
related to passage.2 1 ' UNCLOS III specifically excludes from
"innocent passage" submerged submarines, non-U.S. military
aircraft, foreign-flag fishing, intelligence gathering and weap-
ons practice.21 2 Therefore, the essential effect of the 1988
Proclamation is the extension of U.S. enforcement powers for
national security reasons.
The 1988 Proclamation, however, has no effect on prop-
erty rights between the federal and state government, which is
reserved for Congress to address.21 5 The 1988 Proclamation
does not require a redefinition of the term "territorial sea" in
any U.S. federal or state statute.2 4 To extend the territorial
sea for domestic purposes, Congress must enact legislation
206. See supra note 10 and accompanying text (defining authority of Presidential
Proclamations and Executive Orders).
207. 1988 Proclamation, supra note 9.
208. See supra note 23 and accompanying text (citing national security as primary
reason for 1988 Proclamation).
209. S. SWARZTRAUBER, THE THREE-MILE LIMIT OF THE TERRITORIAL SEA, 192-94
(1974). The former Soviet Union had defended the twelve-mile limit on those
grounds. Id. Russia under the Tsars asserted a twelve-mile territorial sea. Id.
210. UNCLOS III, supra note 1, art. 19, 21 I.L.M. at 1274; OXMAN, supra note
36, at 150-51; 1988 Proclamation, supra note 9.
211. UNCLOS III, supra note 1, art. 19, 21 I.L.M. at 1274.
212. UNCLOS III, supra note 1, arts. 19-21, 21 I.L.M. at 1274.
213. U.S. CoNsT. art. IV, § 3[2].
214. See supra note 108 and accompanying text (stating that nothing in 1988
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specifically redefining "territorial sea" to denote twelve miles
from the coast, instead of the current "three mile" definition in
U.S. domestic law.2 t5
B. A Congressional Expansion of the Territorial Sea Will Augment
the U.S. Government's Power to Enforce Statutes Against
Non- U.S. Parties
Domestic legislation enacting the 1988 Proclamation must
be passed to address the constitutional problems arising from
the extension of U.S. territory nine additional miles from
shore.21 6 Although a congressional extension of the territorial
sea will impact the international community, 'the United States
would benefit from a congressional territorial sea extension by
enforcing its federal statutes twelve miles from its shore rather
than the current three miles. The United States has waited
long enough to join the other 114 nations presently claiming a
twelve-mile territorial sea.21 7 Although the United States had
claimed a 200-mile EEZ, which gave it exclusive rights to de-
velop and use all maritime resources, U.S. reluctance to claim
an extension of its territorial sea weakened its traditional role
as a leader, advocate, and follower of customary international
law of the sea.218 The United States, by extending its territo-
rial sea to twelve miles in its federal statutes, will recoup its
role as a forerunner in customary international law.
Extending the contiguous zone to twenty-four miles as
most U.S. bills propose, will not dramatically change the au-
thority of the U.S. government to enforce immigration laws,
customs laws, and drug interdiction.21 9 Congress has already
Proclamation extends or alters existing federal or state law or any obligations derived
therefrom).
215. See H.R. REP. No. 102-843, pt. (I), 102d Cong., 2d Sess., at 9-10 (stating
that there are constitutional problems with Presidential Proclamation alone, amend-
ing U.S. domestic statutes).
216. See supra notes 114-15 and accompanying text (discussing opinion of Jus-
tice Department and history of U.S. territorial acquisition).
217. See supra note 106 and accompanying text (giving status of 144 reporting
nations and their territorial sea limit).
218. See WILLIAM T. BURKE, CONSENSUS AND CONFRONTATION: THE UNITED
STATES AND THE LAW OF THE SEA CONVENTION 296-97 (1985) (criticizing United States
continued adherence to three-mile limit in light of its view of international customary
law).
219. UNCLOS III, supra note 1, art. 33, 1(a), 2, 21 I.L.M. at 1276; H.R. REP.
No. 102-843, pt. (I), 102d Cong., 2d Sess., at 1.
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given the Coast Guard and the President the power to search
and seize vessels upon the high seas and zones over which the
United States has jurisdiction to prevent, detect, and suppress
violations of U.S. laws.2 2 Congress also permits the President
to declare by statute portions of the high seas as customs-en-
forcement areas, 22' and to declare exclusive rights to explore,
conserve, and manage the natural resources 200 miles from
shore under the EEZ. 222
Although extending the contiguous zone will not have a
significant impact on the United States and its relations to the
international community, congressional extension of the "ter-
ritorial sea" will affect the international community by redefin-
ing the meaning of "territorial sea" in most federal statutes
that use the term or rely on the concept of a territorial sea
zone. 223 Consequently, all of the federal statutes concerning
the protection of the marine environment, vessel operations
and vessel safety will be applicable to any party or vessel, do-
mestic or foreign, entering the twelve-mile zone instead of the
current three-mile zone.2 24 This will significantly affect the in-
ternational shipping industry because any vessel within the ex-
panded U.S. territorial sea would be subject to these statutes
as the vessel would be within U.S. sovereignty.
In the area of marine environmental protection, congres-
sional enactment of the 1988 Proclamation's twelve-mile limit
would enhance the ability of the Coast Guard to enforce the
Act to Prevent Pollution from Ships 22 5 by extending U.S. sov-
ereignty nine miles further from the current three mile bound-
ary.22 6 By amending the Shore Protection Act of 1988 to apply
220. 14 U.S.C. § 89(a) (1988). "High seas" are all parts of the sea that are not
included in the territorial sea, contiguous zone, or exclusive economic zone. UN-
CLOS III, supra note 1, art. 86, 21 I.L.M. at 1286. The high seas are normally open
to all nations, and freedom of the high seas generally includes freedom of navigation,
overflight, fishing, scientific research, freedom to lay submarine cables and pipelines,
freedom to construct artificial islands and other installations permitted under inter-
national law. UNCLOS III, supra note 1, art. 87, 21 I.L.M. at 1286.
221. 19 U.S.C. § 1701 (1988).
222. See supra notes 88-103 and accompanying text (discussing Exclusive Eco-
nomic Zone).
223. See supra note 167 and accompanying text (listing numerous federal stat-
utes likely to be amended by congressional extension of territorial sea).
224. Id.
225. APPS, supra note 182.
226. Id.
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to the twelve mile zone, the United States would have addi-
tional protection from illegal discharges of garbage from ves-
sels operating in U.S. coastal waters.227 In addition, a congres-
sional bill would amend the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 to pro-
vide additional protection of U.S. waters from oil spills caused
by foreign or domestic vessels and facilities.228
In the area of vessel operation and safety, under the
Prohibitions of Foreign Vessels Act,229 non-U.S. vessels are ex-
cluded from conducting wrecking operations within the terri-
torial waters of the United States. 230 A congressional bill rede-
fining "territorial sea" would prohibit non-U.S. ships from sal-
vage operations within the twelve-mile zone instead of the
previous three miles. 2 3' This change is significant because
many collisions at sea occur upon approaches to port, where
marine traffic is heaviest, thereby reducing the economic ad-
vantage of non-U.S. wrecking operations within the wrecking
industry. 2  By clarifying that "waters subject to the jurisdic-
227. Shore Protection Act, 33 U.S.C. § 2609(d) (1988). See supra note 59 and
accompanying text (discussing sovereignty of nations and power to enforce national
laws within sovereign territory).
228. 33 U.S.C. § 2701 (1988 & Supp. III 1991).
229. See supra note 130 and accompanying text (defining wrecking operations).
Prohibitions of Foreign Vessel Act, 46 U.S.C. § 316(d) (1988). Under this statute,
there is a limited exception when no U.S. flag ship is available in the locality and the
Commissioner of Customs authorizes use of a non-U.S. vessel. Id.
230. See supra note 130 (explaining wrecking operations).
231. Jones Bill, supra note 166, at 2.
232. See supra note 130 and accompanying text (setting forth U.S. protective pol-
icies against non-U.S. competitors in the shipping industry). Vessel operations
would also be affected by congressional expansion of the territorial sea by amending
§ 7 of the Rivers and Harbors Appropriations Act of 1915. 33 U.S.C. § 471 (1988).
By including within the term "navigable waters of the United States" all waters of the
twelve-mile territorial sea, the Secretary of Transportation, acting through the Coast
Guard, will have expanded authority to establish anchorage grounds for U.S. and
non-U.S. vessels in all waters of the twelve-mile territorial sea, instead of the previous
three mile area. Id.
In addition, vessel safety along U.S. coastlines would be reinforced because
under a congressional bill extending the territorial sea to twelve miles, non-U.S. ves-
sels entering U.S. waters at the twelve-mile mark would have to comply with the Ves-
sel Bridge-to-Bridge Radiotelephone Act. Vessel Bridge-to-Bridge Radiotelephone
Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1202 (1988 & Supp. 11 1990). By expanding the term "territorial
sea" within this statute, all non-U.S. vessels would be required to have radio tele-
phones, thereby enhancing navigational safety. Id. In addition, the Ports and Water-
ways Safety Act would also expand its definition of "navigable waters of the United
States" and would further expand the Coast Guard's authority to establish vessel
operating requirements, including vessel traffic controls, for all U.S. and non-U.S.
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tion of the United States" include all waters of the new twelve-
mile territorial sea, the authority of the Coast Guard to control
and assess penalties against any vessel operating negligently in
U.S. waters would be expanded as well. 2 " Thus all vessels,
including non-U.S. flag ships, will be open to expanded crimi-
nal responsibility for negligent navigation and operation once
they are within twelve miles of the U.S. coast.
The impact of a congressional territorial sea extension will
also be felt by the international shipping industry. Collisions
that occur within U.S. territorial waters are subject to U.S.
Coast Guard investigations and administrative hearings.2 4
Because the majority of collisions take place within the twelve
mile mark, where maritime traffic is heaviest, more parties to
the collisions, including non-U.S. parties and non-U.S. wit-
nesses will be summoned before U.S. Coast Guard hearings
than previously. 2 "-
The international shipping industry will also be affected
by an expanded applicability of Rule E(3)(a) of the Supplemen-
tal Rules for Certain Admiralty and Maritime Claims.236 In
maritime litigation, this procedural rule provides that service
of process must be within the federal district where suit is
brought. 23 7 Under the SLA, state boundaries end at three
miles from the shore but under the 1988 Proclamation U.S.
boundaries continue until the twelve mile mark. 3 8 Whether
service will now be permitted up to twelve miles from the
shore of a given district is a question that will inevitably come
vessels within the twelve-mile territorial sea. Ports and Waterways Safety Act, 33
U.S.C. § 1222 (1988).
233. 46 U.S.C. §§ 2301-2302 (1988).
234. 33 CFR § 1.01-20 (1992). The Coast Guard has the authority to inspect
vessels within the U.S. territorial waters for compliance with laws and regulations
regarding the safe construction, equipment, manning and operations of any vessel,
and to conduct investigations of marine casualties and accidents. Id.
235. See id.
236. Rules, supra note 132.
237. Id.; see supra notes 133-38 and accompanying text (stating that federal dis-
trict for process service purposes extends to states' boundary, which under Sub-
merged Lands Act is three miles from shore).238. See supra notes 108-13 and accompanying text (setting forth federal-state
property boundaries at 3 mile boundary and U.S. sovereignty boundary at 12 mile
mark).
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before the courts.23 9
Through congressional extension of the territorial sea
from three to twelve miles, the United States will gain an addi-
tional nine miles around its coastal shores to enforce its na-
tional laws against U.S. as well as non-U.S. parties. This ex-
panded power to enforce national law is not only equitable and
advantageous for the United States, but is also fair from an in-
ternational perspective. One hundred and twenty-six out of
144 reporting nations in the world today have a territorial sea
of at least twelve miles.2 40 Eighty-eight percent of the world's
nations are currently enforcing their national laws against their
citizens and non-citizens twelve miles from shore.24' In light
of this trend, it is only fair to allow the United States the same
rights and privileges as other nations in this respect despite the
effects on non-U.S. parties entering U.S. territorial waters.
Otherwise, the United States would be at a disadvantage when
comparing other nation's enforcement powers.
C. Federal Jurisdiction Should Prevail Over the Extended Zone to
Ensure Multilateral Harmonization of Marine Pollution
Control Policies as Required by UNCLOS III
A congressional extension of the territorial sea to twelve
239. See Rules, supra note 132 (stating service of process shall be served within
the federal district but not defining federal district).
Joel Glass, USA: US Coast Guard Casts Doubts on New Zones Proposed by Congress,
REUTERS, Lloyds List, Feb. 11, 1992 available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, CURRNT file.
Another consequence of domestic legislation expanding the territorial sea to twelve
miles is the effect on non-U.S. vessel activity now permitted in the three to twelve
mile zone. Id. Enactment of the Jones' bill or similar legislation may affect activities
of non-U.S. vessels now permitted to support U.S. fishing vessels in the three to
twelve mile zone. Id. If these activities were barred, joint ventures between U.S. and
non-U.S. fish processors could be adversely affected by requiring all fish processors
to be U.S.-owned. Id.
Domestic enactment may also effect U.S.-based foreign flag "cruises to no-
where" operations. Id. The ships used for "cruises to nowhere" currently travel
beyond the three mile boundary from a U.S. port, and operate "legal" gambling
cruises because the ship is beyond the three mile territorial sea line and therefore
beyond U.S. jurisdiction. Id. Legislation extending U.S. boundaries to twelve miles
will make it more difficult for these otherwise illegal gambling operations to conduct
business, which is in the interest of the U.S. maritime industry because non-U.S. ship-
owners will no longer be reaping profits by maneuvering around U.S. anti-gambling
laws. Id.
240. See supra note 106 and accompanying text (setting forth statistics of territo-
rial sea limit of 144 nations).
241. Id.
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miles should preserve U.S. federal jurisdiction over the ex-
panded three to twelve mile zone because the federal govern-
ment is more competent to uniformly sustain that area's envi-
ronmental protection.242 Under UNCLOS I, the United States
is required to promulgate regulations to prevent pollution re-
sulting from the exploitation of the ocean's submerged
lands.243 UNCLOS III requires that nations endeavor to
standardize their marine protection policies with other signa-
tory nations. 244 U.S. federal control over submerged lands
would allow the United States to standardize its marine pollu-
tion policies with other nations more so than individual state
control would allow.
The United States ratified UNCLOS I, which requires that
every nation create regulations to prevent pollution of the seas
resulting from exploitation of the seabed and its subsoil.2 4 5 In
addition, the U.S. federal government substantially agrees with
the provisions of UNCLOS III, except for its Deep Seabed
Mining Provisions.2 46 Extension of the U.S. territorial sea out
to twelve miles gives the United States the responsibility to
comply with the duty to protect and preserve its marine envi-
ronment even though the United States has not yet ratified
UNCLOS III.
President Reagan stated that UNCLOS III contains provi-
sions that concern traditional uses of the oceans that generally
conform to international law and practice. 247 According to
President Reagan, the United States is prepared to act in ac-
cordance with those provisions that fairly balance the interests
of all nations.2 48 Thus, the United States accepts UNCLOS
III's provisions concerning "traditional uses" of the sea as cus-
242. UNCLOS III, supra note 1, arts. 275-277, 21 I.L.M. at 1321.
243. High Seas Convention, supra note 18, art. 24, 13 U.S.T. at 2319, 450
U.N.T.S. at 96.
244. UNCLOS III, supra note 1, art. 194(1), 21 I.L.M. at 1308.
245. High Seas Convention, supra note 18, art. 24, 13 U.S.T. at 2319, 450
U.N.T.S. at 96.
246. H.R. REP. No. 102-843, pt. (I), 102d Cong., 2d Sess., at 10; see supra note
49 and accompanying text (setting forth U.S. reasons for not ratifying UNCLOS III).
247. 21 I.L.M. 464 (1983).
248. 19 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 383-85 (Mar. 14, 1983). The President, ex-
ercising his constitutional powers in conducting relations with foreign countries has
the authority to express the will of the United States to participate in the creation of
new rules of customary international law. Louis HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE
CONSTIrrUTION 188 (1972).
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tomary international law, binding upon the United States, and
therefore is obliged to protect its territorial sea through uni-
form measures. 249 This includes the provisions calling for the
harmonization of signatories' regulations to protect and pre-
serve the marine environment, which the United States argua-
bly accepts as customary international law.2 50 Therefore, the
federal government is more suitable than the individual states
to insure multilateral harmonization of standards for marine
protection.2 5'
Extension of the U.S. territorial sea out to twelve miles
gives the United States the responsibility to comply with the
duty to protect and preserve its marine environment even
though the United States has not yet ratified UNCLOS 111.252
President Reagan stated that UNCLOS III contains provisions
that concern traditional uses of the oceans that generally con-
form to international law and practice.253 According to Presi-
dent Reagan, the United States is prepared to observe those
provisions that fairly balance the interests of all nations.254
Thus, the United States accepts UNCLOS III's provisions con-
cerning "traditional uses" of the sea as customary interna-
tional law, binding upon the United States, and therefore is
obliged to protect its territorial sea through uniform meas-
ures.
255
Compliance with international conventions such as UN-
CLOS I and UNCLOS III, and attention to international con-
cerns such as maritime pollution, should override any financial
interest of individual U.S. states. Uniformity of marine pollu-
249. SCHOENBAUM, supra note 27, at 23.
250. UNCLOS III, supra note 1, art. 275, 21 I.L.M. at 1321; SCHOENBAUM, supra
note 27, at 23.
251. Nandon Speech, supra note 4.
252. See High Seas Convention, supra note 18. Under the High Seas Conven-
tion, the United States is obliged to protect and preserve its marine environment
from oil pollution as well as pollution from sea-bed exploration. Id. art. 24, 13
U.S.T. at 2318, 450 U.N.T.S. at 98.
253. 19 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 383-85 (Mar. 14, 1982); 22 I.L.M. 464
(1983).
254. 19 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 383-85 (Mar. 14, 1983). The President, ex-
ercising his constitutional powers in conducting relations with foreign countries has
the authority to express the will of the United States to participate in the creation of
new rules of customary international law. Louis HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE
CONSTITrrTION 188 (1972).
255. SCHOENBAUM, supra note 27, at 23.
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tion laws and U.S. adherence to the principles of customary
international law are of utmost importance and can effectively
be accomplished if administered by the federal government.256
Order, stability and predictability are the goals of UNCLOS
III, including the duty of every nation to preserve and protect
the marine environment. 2 7 Although certain states like Cali-
fornia and Florida are more apt to be environmentally protec-
tive of their offshore oceans, this fact does not guarantee uni-
formity throughout all of the coastal states. 258 The federal
government, while benefitting from the fiscal advantages ofju-
risdiction over the seabed, which includes rights to lease the
ocean floor for oil and gas drilling, will have uniform pollution
prevention standards and uniform policies regarding leasing of
submerged lands.
Although Congressional extension of the territorial sea
will modify many federal statutes, the Submerged Lands Act,
which provides for state control over the three mile zone,
should remain unchanged.259 If individual states had property
rights beyond those allowed under the SLA, state leasing poli-
cies would vary according to each state's environmental poli-
cies. Despite the desire of several states to share in the large
revenues generated through the leasing of submerged lands
for oil and gas drilling, the environmentally protective laws of
other states would prove to be a major impediment to the U.S.
oil and gas industry.26 °
The oil and gas industries fear that the states with environ-
mentally protective policies would hamper development of oil
and gas exploration.26' If legislation granted property rights
to the states, including rights to grant mineral leases, in the
newly extended zone, those states protective of their marine
environment would not grant leases for oil and gas drilling
256. See supra notes 55-56 and accompanying text (discussing that United States
is obliged under certain UNCLOS III provisions to protect its marine environment).
257. Nandon Speech, supra note 4; UNCLOS III, supra note 1, art. 193, 21
I.L.M. at 1308.
258. See supra note 189 (citing California, North Carolina, and Florida as envi-
ronmentally protective states).
259. See e.g., supra note 167 (setting forth examples of modified federal statutes);
see also supra notes 114-17 and accompanying text (explaining constitutional
problems).
260. Morris, supra note 189, at 9.
261. Id.
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while other states may grant such leases. 262 If legislation is
adopted that would give state jurisdiction over the three to
twelve mile zone, oil companies would have to negotiate min-
eral exploration leases on a state by state basis.263 Conse-
quently, these companies would obtain leases in some states,
while losing contracts in others depending on the state's inter-
est in developing oil exploration within its coastal waters.
Federal control of the three to twelve mile zone will guar-
antee a uniform leasing policy for the oil and gas industry,
while assuring uniform standards for safeguarding against oil
and gas pollution. In addition, the federal government may be
more adept than the states at financing environmental protec-
tion standards uniformly and implementing the necessary safe-
guards to ensure protection of U.S. coastal waters against pol-
lution caused by submerged land exploitation.
The desire to share in the large revenues derived from gas
and oil leases, royalties, and rents from the Continental Shelf
is the primary reason why certain U.S. states are interested in
extending their jurisdictional control over the three to twelve
mile zone.26 4 The U.S. federal government, however, should
maintain control over the three to twelve mile zone to create
uniform protection against pollution. Activities such as oil and
gas drilling near shores create significant potential for marine
pollution. 65
Seabed exploitation presents a risk for this dangerous type
of pollution, especially as technological advances in the future
allow exploration of the seabed at deeper levels.266 Accidents
involving floating or submersible rigs that drill the seabed to
force gas and oil into pipelines are universal. 267 The exploita-
262. See supra note 189 (discussing California, Florida, and North Carolina as
environmentally protective of their coastal waters).
263. Morris, supra note 189, at 9.
264. See supra note 189 (discussing states that desire to lease seabed for oil and
gas exploration).
265. See William 0. Douglas, Environmental Problems of the Oceans: The Need for
International Controls, 1 ENvrL. L. 149, 161 (1971) (stating Justice William 0. Douglas
stressed need for effective regulation of seabed drilling because it presented new
type of dangerous pollution).
266. Id.
267. MANGONE, supra note 20, at 259. Examples of two such accidents in the
United States are the Santa Barbara surge of 14,000 tons of oil into the sea in 1969,
contaminating forty miles of the California coast, and the "blowout" in the Bay of
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tion of petroleum in the submerged continental shelf will con-
tinue as nations grapple with a global energy crisis especially in
light of a growing international concern for our global envi-
ronment as evidenced by the 1992 Earth Summit in Rio de
Janeiro.268 UNCLOS III stresses every nation's duty to harmo-
nize its pollution protection policies with other nations, in or-
der to create a uniform multilateral system of marine protec-
tion.269
CONCLUSION
Domestic legislation enacting the 1988 Proclamation is
imperative and should include an extension of the territorial
sea and contiguous zone because it complies with the sugges-
tions of UNCLOS III. Although the United States has not yet
ratified UNCLOS III, an extension of the territorial sea would
allow the U.S. to join the majority of nations with the twelve-
mile limit and thus comply with customary international law.
The federal versus state dispute in Congress over control of
the submerged lands between the three and twelve mile lines
should be resolved by emphasizing the role of the United
States as a world leader in marine pollution control and allow
the federal government complete jurisdiction in this respect.
This position allows the U.S. federal government to monitor
non-U.S. vessel activity within the territorial sea and simultane-
ously comply with the comprehensive protection provisions for
international cooperation on safeguarding the oceans outlined
in UNCLOS III.
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